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DISCRIMINATION LAW-STATUTORY PROTECTION FOR VOLUN
TEERS AGAINST DISCRIMINATION: Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of

America, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 204
Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987).

INTRODUCTION

In Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts ofAmerica, Inc. v. Commission
on Human Rights and Opportunities,l the Connecticut Supreme Court
held that the Boy Scouts of America did not discriminate under Con
necticut's public accommodation statute2 when it denied Catherine
Pollard the opportunity to be scoutmaster because she is a woman.
The court based its decision on its belief that the proffer of services is
not an accommodation as that term is used in the statute. 3 In rejecting
Pollard's offer to serve, the court concluded that the Boy Scouts did
not refuse her any accommodation and thus did not violate the
statute. 4
Quinnipiac Council presents a question much broader than
whether Ms. Pollard should have been allowed to be a scoutmaster; it
implicates the legal rights of all volunteers to serve free of discrimina
tion. 5 According to Quinnipiac Council, volunteers who suffer dis
1. 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987).
2. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-63(1), 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986) (formerly codi
fied at § 53-35(a) (Rev. 1977). For the text of the statute, see infra note 27.
3. Catherine Pollard claimed that her offering to be ofservice to the organization was
an "llccommodation" whereas the court stated that an "accommodation" is the establish
ment's making available its goods and services to the public. Quinnipiac Council, 204
Conn. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360. For a detailed discussion of this distinction, see infra notes
206-07 and accompanying text.
4. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360.
5. Voluntarism is deeply rooted in American culture. In fact, it was the combined
efforts of many unnamed volunteers that marked and shaped the development of the
United States. For a historical account of the involvement of volunteers in America since
colonial times, see S. ELLIS & K. NOYES, By THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF AMERICANS
As VOLUNTEERS (1978).
Today, an estimated 37 million Americans, or one out of every four over the age of
fourteen, participate in volunteer activities. These statistics, however, are based only on
involvement in formalized or organized volunteer groups. If unorganized services could be
calculated and added, the figures would increase dramatically. K. ALLEN, WORKER VOL
UNTEERING: A NEW RESOURCE FOR THE 1980s 5 (1980).
Given the diversity of American life, volunteers engage in a variety of work in many
areas including the fields of labor, agriculture, business and industry, communication,
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crimination based on race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex,
marital status, age, or physical disability6 receive no protection or re
lief from the accommodation statute. Perhaps uncomfortable with the
implications of its decision, the Quinnipiac Council court itself referred
volunteers claiming discrimination to the labor employment statute
for possible protection. 7
Since the plaintiff's challenge in Quinnipiac Council was under
the Connecticut public accommodation statute, this note, in Part I,
first discusses the legislative and judicial expansion of the public ac
commodation statute and the countervailing constitutional limitations
to its scope. This section also considers the policy, statutory, and con
stitutional dimensions of the conflict between the protected classes'
claimed right to non-discriminatory treatment and the organization's
asserted freedom of selection. Against this background, Part II fo
cuses on the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision excluding the prof
fer of services from the scope of the public accommodation statute. 8
Part III explores whether, despite Quinnipiac Council's holding, vol
unteers can find protection from discrimination under a reinterpreted
or an amended public accommodation statute. 9 The note then ad
dresses difficulties raised by broadening the coverage of the public ac
commodation statute to encompass volunteers. Protecting volunteers
under the public accommodation statute runs the risk of infringing on
the asserted rights of the organization-whether the boy scouts, a reli
gious group or a political organization-to select its volunteers ac
cording to its own standards. lO On account of these incongruities,
Part IV!! evaluates the Connecticut Supreme Court's suggestion that
transportation, social welfare, health care, education, religion, recreation, the arts, environ
mentalism, justice, the military, civic and political activism, and foreign involvement. For
an in-depth discussion of the various forms of voluntarism in each of these fields, see S.
ELLIS & K. NOYES, supra, at 227-50.
6. Discrimination in access to public accommodations based on these categories is
prohibited by CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986). The District of Co
lumbia additionally bans discrimination based on classifications of sexual orientation, ma
triculation, and political affiliation. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2519(a) (1981 & Supp. 1988).
7. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360. See CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46a-6O(a)(I) (West 1986) (protects individuals from employment refusals, dis
charges, and unequal treatment in the terms and conditions of employment due to race,
color, creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of
mental disorder, mental retardation, or physical disability). See infra note 187 for the full
text of Connecticut's Unfair Employment Practice Act.
8. See infra notes 149-98 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 228-33 and accompanying text.
II. See infra notes 211-98 and accompanying text.
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the employment statute might safeguard volunteers' interests. 12

I.
A.

THE ACCOMMODATION STATUTES

History and Purpose

The public accommodation statutes have their origin in the com
mon law obligation of innkeepers and "common carriers" to admit
and serve all travellers. 13 The statutes rested on the premise that these
privately-owned businesses were in some degree public. 14 Thus, the
owners had a duty to provide equal access to all. IS The public accom
modation statutes were enacted to protect this access.
As a reinforcement of the common law, the public accommoda
tion statutes have a long history. Proscription of discrimination in
public accommodations dates back to the Civil War period and the
enactment of the Civil War amendments. 16 After the ratification of
the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution,17 Congress enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1875 in an attempt to protect blacks from discrimi
natory acts by state officials and private persons. IS The Act prohibited
racial discrimination in motels, theaters, places of public amusements,
and on public transportation. 19
When the United States Supreme Court, in the Civil Rights Cases
12. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text.
13. Avins, What is a Place of "Public" Accommodation?, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 1,2-7
(1968); Tobriner & Grodin, The Individual and the Public Service Enterprise in the New
Industrial State, 55 CAL. L. REv. 1247, 1249-50 (1967); Note, Discrimination in Access to
Public Places: A Survey ofState and Federal Public Accommodations Laws, 7 N.Y.U. REv.
L. Soc. CHANGE 215, 218 (1978).
14. Tobriner & Grodin, supra note 13, at 1249-50.
15. Id.
16. See Stephenson, The Separation of the Races in Public Conveyances, 3 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 180, 184 (1909).
.
17. The fourteenth amendment was ratified in 1868. The first section of it states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdic
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CoNST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Relying on the authority of this first section, Congress passed the Civil Rights Bill of
1875. See Stephenson, supra note 16, at 184.
18. Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335, ch. 114, §§ 1-2 (1875). This statute states
in part: "[A]II persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled to the
full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, and privileges of
inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other places of public amusement
...." It prohibited discrimination based on race and color. Id.
19. Id.
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of 1883,20 invalidated the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
against private individuals,21 states soon began to enact their own pub
lic accommodation statutes,22 and, at present, thirty-nine states and
the District of Columbia have such laws. 23 Finally, in its most recent
20. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). These cases involved four criminal
indictments and one civil action under Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. The
section provided that anyone who racially discriminated against others so as to bar them
from "full and equal enjoyment" of public facilities and conveyances was subject to crimi
nal and civil penalties. 18 Stat. 335, ch. 114, § 1 (1875). The five defendants were individu
als and railroads who had excluded blacks from their facilities on the basis of race. Since
the Court determined that these claims did not involve state action, the plaintiffs 'were not
protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Even though the concept of state conduct is now
broader, the Supreme Court continues to hold that there is no violation of the fourteenth
amendment absent state action. Comment, The Fourteenth Amendment. Congressional
Power. and Private Discrimination: United States v. Guest, 14 UCLA L. REV. 553, 578-79
(1967).
21. The Court held that the fourteenth amendment guaranteed protection only
against governmental or state action and that legislative regulation of private wrongs under
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 was an unwarranted and unconstitutional expansion offederal
powers over individuals. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
22. In the 1880's, a number of northern states including Connecticut, Indiana, Mas
sachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island passed
statutes which were near replicas of the federal act. Stephenson, supra note 16, at 186;
Avins, supra note 13, at 14-22 (discussion of early state statutes modeled on the federal
act).
23. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.80.200-18.80.300 (1986); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41
1441 to 41-1442 (1985); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 24-34-601 to 24-34-605 (1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-63 to 46a-64
(West 1986 & Supp. 1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 4501-4516 (1975, Supp. 1986 &
1987 Interim Supp.); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2504, 1-2511, 1-2519 (1981 & Supp.
1988); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7301 to 18-7303 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 5-101 to
5-103 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9-1-1 to 22-9-1-3 (West 1981 &
Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 601A.I-601A.7 (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44
1001, 44-1009(c) (1986); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.120-334.145 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill
1983 & Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, §§ 4551-4553, 4591-4593 (1979 & Supp.
1988); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 5-13 (1986 & Supp. 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 272, §§ 92A, 98 (West 1970 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. §§ 37.2301
37.2303 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01-363.03 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 49-1-102(2), 49-2-304 (1987); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20
132 to 20-143 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 651.050-651.120 (Michie 1986); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-A:l, 354-A:3(IX), 354-A:8(IV) (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5
5(1) to 10:5-12 (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 28-1-2(H), 28-1-7(F), 28-1
9 (1988); N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290(3), 291(2), 292(9), 296(2) (McKinney 1982); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-14-04 (1985 & Supp. 1987); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 4112.01
4112.02 (Anderson 1980 & Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 1401-1402 (West
1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 30.670-30.685 (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-954,955
(i) (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1988); R.1. GEN. LAWS §§ 11-24-1 to 11-24-8 (1981 & Supp.
1988); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-13-1(12), 20-13-23 (1987); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 4-21-501 to 4-21-503 (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13-7-1 to 13-7-4 (1986 & Supp.
1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4501-4502 (Supp. 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 9.91.010, 49.60.010, 49.60.030(2), 49.60.040, 49.60.215 (1962, 1988 & Supp. 1988); W.
VA. CODE §§ 5-11-2,5-11-3, 5-11-9(f), 5-11-19 (1987 & Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. ANN.
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response to this issue, Congress enacted a federal public accommoda
tion statute in 1964. 24
Although public accommodations were originally limited to the
two general categories of innkeepers and "common carriers," the pres
ent meaning of public accommodation is much broader. It now en
compasses any establishment which offers goods. and services to the
public. 2s
B.

The Connecticut Accommodation Statute

Like many states,26 Connecticut has followed the general trend
and broadened the scope of its public accommodation statute. 27 Prior
to 1953, the Connecticut statute defined a "place of public accommo
§§ 942.04(1)(b), 942.04(2), ~42;04(3} (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); WYo. STAT. § 6-9-101
(1988). Louisiana guarantees equal access to public accommodations in its constitutional
provision. LA. CoNST. art. I, § 12. The following states are without public accommoda
tion statutes: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida; Georgia, Hawaii, Mississippi, Missouri, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
24. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1982). Nearly a century after the 1883 decision in
the Civil Rights Cases, when Congress again sought to eliminate discrimination in public
accommodations, it relied on additional constitutional provisions. Since the Court had
greatly expanded the scope of the commerce clause (see Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937», the drafters of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1982» relied upon the authority of both the four
teenth amendment and the commerce clause. See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964). See also Note,
Civil Rights Act of 1964-Public Accommodations-Private Club Exemption, 45 N.C. L.
REV. 498, 499-500 (1967); Avins, supra note 13, at 7-14.
25. See Note, supra note 13, at 218, 290-91. Public accommodations now include:
cemeteries, see, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-601 (1982), beauty parlors and barber
shops, see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.300(12) (1986), garages and gas stations, see, e.g.,
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (1979 & SUpp. 1988), swimming pools, see, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A(5) (West Supp. 1988), and bathhouses and
restrooms, see, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502(24) (1981 & Supp. 1988).
26. See generally Note, supra note 13 (offering a discussion and comparison of the
development of states' public accommodation statutes).
27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64(a)(1) (West 1986) provides in part:
It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) To deny any
person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any
place of public accommodation, resort or amusement because of race, creed,
color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, mental retardation or
physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or deafness of the ap
plicant, subject only to the conditions and limitations established by law and ap
plicable alike to all persons; (2) to discriminate, segregate or separate on account
of race, creed, color, national origin, ancestry, sex, marital status, age, mental
retardation or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness or
deafness.
Id.
.. 'Place of public accommodation, resort or amusement' means any establishment
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dation" by listing establishments which offered food, lodging, trans
portation, or entertainment to the general public. 28 In 1953, the
Connecticut legislature abandoned the list approach and adopted in
stead a functional definition; a place of public accommodation is now
defined as any "establishment which caters or offers its services or fa
cilities or goods to the general public .... "29
By defining "public accommodation" functionally in terms of
conduct engaged in by the establishment, the legislature expanded the
coverage of the Connecticut law. Most obviously, the class of persons
and businesses subject to the law is now much broader and hence more
inclusive. More importantly, the prohibition against discrimination
applies to all qualified "establishments" and is no longer limited to
specific places. 30 In addition to the more expansive definition of
"place of public accommodation," the Connecticut legislature also has
enlarged the scope of the statute by adding sex,3) physical disability,32
and marital status 33 as additional classes of persons protected from
which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public ...." Id. at
§ 46a-63(1).
28. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 691a (Supp. 1949). Prior to 1953, the Connecticut legisla
ture defined a "public accommodation" as: "[A]II ... inns, taverns, roadhouses, hotels,
restaurants and eating houses or any place where food is sold for consumption on the
premises; railroad cars and stations, street railway cars and stations, public service busses
and taxicabs; and theaters, motion picture houses, music haIls, amusement and recreation
parks." Id.
29. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-63(1) (West 1986).
30. "[T]he unconditional language of the statute, the history of its steadily expanded
coverage, and the compelling interest in eliminating discriminatory public accommodation
practices persuade us that physical situs is not today an essential element of our public
accommodation law." Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of Am., Inc. v. Commission on
Human Rights and Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 297, 528 A.2d 352, 358 (1987).
"[T]he amended Connecticut statute does not define a place of. public accommodation
merely in terms of locale; it does not say 'any establishment where services or facilities or
goods are offered' .... Rather, 'place of public accommodation' is now defined as 'any
establishment which . .. offers its services or facilities or goods to the general public.' The
shift in emphasis and meaning is clear." Brief for Defendant by Susan Bartholomew at 18,
Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America v. Commission on Human Rights and Oppor
tunities, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987) (qouting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Commission
on Human Rights and Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 297, 528 A.2d 352, 358 (1987». The
defendant based her analysis on the interpretation of the Minnesota statute in United States
Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1981).
31. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986). Sex was added as a pro
hibited reason for the refusal of public accommodations in 1973 Conn. Acts 119.
32. Id. In 1973, the Connecticut legislature inserted: "or physical disability, includ
ing but not limited to, blindness" into the public accommodation statute. See 1973 Conn.
Acts 279, § 6.
33. Id. In 1974, the Connecticut legislature amended the accommodation statute by
inserting "marital status." See 1974 Conn. Acts 205.
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discrimination.34
As stated above, public accommodation laws of other states have
evolved in a similar manner.35 As a result, the statutes of different
states frequently resemble one another both with regard to the cover
age encompassed by "place of public accommodation"36 and to the
classes protected under the statutes. 37 This similarity has permitted
courts to refer to judicial interpretations of other states' public accom
modation statutes in discussing the meaning and scope of their own. 38
34.

For the full text of the Connecticut public accommodation statute, see supra note

27.

35. See Note, supra note 13. "Many public accommodations statutes have undergone
frequent amendments and additions since their original appearance on the statute books.
As legislative awareness of and hostility toward discrimination has grown, more accommo·
dations were added, additional groups protected, and definitions of the offense expanded."
Id. at 245.
36. The Minnesota statute, which uses a general definition, states that "place of pub
lic accommodation" means a "business, accommodation, refreshment, entertainment, rec·
reation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or not, whose goods,
services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or
otherwise made available to the public." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(18) (West 1966 &
Supp. 1988).
Some states, while maintaining a list definition of "place of public accommodation,"
nevertheless share the broad scope of statutes with general definitions by using such terms
as: "including but not limited to." See ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441 (1985); COLO.
REv. STAT. § 24-34-501 (1982); IDAHO CoDE § 18-7302 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 13-1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4553(8) (1979 & Supp.
1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 272, § 92A (West 1970 & Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 49-2-101(17) (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-133 (1987); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 651.050 (Michie 1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(1) (purdon 1964 & Supp. 1988); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-24-3
(1981); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 49.60.040 (1962 & Supp. 1988); WIS. STAT. § 942.04(2)
(West 1982 & Supp. 1988). New Jersey's statute states in part: "'A place of public accom·
modation' shall include, but not be limited to: any tavern, roadhouse, hotel, motel [;] ...
any producer, manufacturer, wholesaler, distributor, retail shop, store, establishment, or
concession dealing with goods or services of any kind; any restaurant ... [or] any public
conveyance ...." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988).
37. Public accommodation statutes commonly protect against discrimination due to
race, color, national origin, ancestry, religion, sex, marital status, and physical handicap.
See Note, supra note 13, at 292-93.
38. See Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468, 473-75, 477 (3d
Cir. 1986); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 80-81, 707 P.2d 212,
217,219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 155 (1985); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of
Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 732, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 337 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S.
1205 (1984); United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 772-73 (Minn. 1981).
These courts have made references and analogies to New Jersey's public accommodation
statute as interpreted in National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc.,
127 N.J. Super. 522,318 A.2d 33 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974).
The Quinnipiac Council court stated that its understanding of the Connecticut public
accommodation statute "accords with that of other courts in our sister states construing
similar legislation." Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 299. The citations include decisions
based on the public accommodation statutes of California, Minnesota, and New Jersey. Id.

100

C.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REJ:IEW

[Vol. 11:93

Judicial Interpretations

This modem and broader definition of "place of public accommo
dation" presents courts with the challenge of re-interpreting the appli
cable statute when confronted with new places, groups, and activities.
This section examines cases where individuals, for reasons based on
race, gender, and sexual orientation, have been denied membership in
various organizations, such as athletic teams,39 boys' clubs,4O and
men's business associations. 41 The judicial decisions applying the re
spective public accommodations statutes to each· of these organiza
tions illustrate the continued trend towards expanding the scope of
these statutes.
Ms. Pollard sought to continue this expansion and further
broaden the scope of Connecticut's public accommodation statute.
Like prior plaintiffs, Pollard was requesting a "male-only" positiop in
an association which the courts, in the following cases, had held was
subject to the public accommodation statute. However, unlike these
other plaintiffs, she was denied protection under the public accommo
dation statute. In order to understand and evaluate the Connecticut
Supreme Court's refusal to protect· Pollard against discrimination by
the Boy Scouts, a general exposition of these. fundamental cases is re
quired. They provide the rationale for the court's distinguishing Ms.
Pollard from women granted relief from sex discrimination in prior
analogous situations.
1) Athletic Teams
National Organization/or Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc. 42
and the United States v. Slidell Youth Football Association 43 were ac
tions brought under public accommodation statutes for alleged dis
crimination in athletics. In Little League, the club barred girls from
Like the Connecticut Supreme Court, this note supports its examination and discussion of
Quinnipiac Council by reference to other states' decisions based on similar public accom~
modation statutes.
39. United States v. Slidell Youth Football Ass'n, 387 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1974);
National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318
A.2d 33 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974).
40. Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 150 (1985); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 147 Cal.
App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
41. Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806'F.2d 468 (3d·Cir. 1986); United
States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
42. 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33 (1974), aff'd, 67 N:J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974).
43. 387 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1974).
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joining the team,44 while in Slidell, the league excluded blacks from
participation. 4s In both of these cases, the courts were not confronted
with a traditional place of public accommodation such as a restau
rant,46 lodging,47 or golf course;48 instead, the courts faced a novel
issue: whether a team or league was a place of public accommodation.
An organization is subject to the public accommodation statute
only if it is a "place" within the meaning of the statute, and only if it is
"public."49 The New Jersey Superior Court in Little League stated
that the term "place" is one "of convenience, not of limitation."so
Although "place" customarily meant a fixed site, such as a restaurant
or a hotel, the court held that it also included a moving situs such as
public transportation. To be a "place" did not require that the organi
zation own or lease a specific parcel of real estate. The league's
"place" was any ballfield at which it played. sl
The Little League court placed more emphasis on the need to be
public than on the need for a specific non-changing locus.
"[M]embership organizations, although not having a 'specific
pinpointable geographic area,' are nevertheless places of public accom
modation if, as Little League does, they offer advantages and facilities
on the basis of a general, public invitation to join."s2 As the court
stated, "the hallmark of a place of public accommodation [is] that 'the
public at large is invited.' "53
The Slidell court 54 likewise found that a sports team was a public
44. Little League, 127 N.J. Super. at 526, 31S A.2d at 35.
45. Slidell, 387 F. Supp. at 478, 480.
46. See Evans v. Fong Poy, 42 Cal. App. 2d 320, 108 P.2d 942 (1941) (plaintiffs'
rights violated when they were refused services by restaurant on racial grounds).
47. See Stout v. YMCA of Bessemer, Alabama, 404 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1968)
(yMCA, which provided lodging for transient guests, wrongfully discriminated when it
refused to accommodate two men solely because they were black).
48. See Anderson v. Pass Christian Isles Golf Club, 488 F.2d 855 (5th Cir. 1974) (in
denying access on the basis of race, the court held that the club violated the Civil Rights
Act of 1964).
49. Little League, 127 N.J. Super. at 531, 318 A.2d at 37.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. (emphasis added). Little League was a "place of public accommodation"
because its sites, though not fixed, were open to the public at large and because it invited all
children, except girls, to join. Id. It offered its "accommodations, advantages, facilities
and privileges" which the court defined as "the entire agglomeration of the arrangements"
for baseball playing by children to the general public. Id.
54. In Slidell, an organization of white families owned a field and supported a foot
baJlleague for young white males in the area. Slidell, 387 F. SUpp. at 476. The court ruled
that since this organization was a public accommodation, it could not exclude blacks from
membership and participation. Id. at 486. The plaintiffs pled their claim under 42 U.S.c.,
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accommodation because it offered all area youth the entertainment of
playing football and provided a form of spectator entertainment to the
general public. 55 According to these decisions, an organization is pub.,.
lic if membership is open to all. The absence of any membership re
quirements, save sex or race, made these organizations public
accommodations subject to the statute.
2) Boys' Clubs
Two recent California cases held that a Boy Scouts of America
Council s6 and a Boys' Club Chapter57 were "business establishments"
under the Unruh Act, California's public accommodation statute. 58
In Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts,59 the Boy Scouts
had expelled a scout member because he was a homosexual and there
fore, supposedly, a poor moral example for the younger boys.60 In
Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc.,61 the Boys' Club barred all
young women from becoming members. 62 Both cases were perplexing
because neither the scouts nor the club was a "business establishment"
in the ordinary sense of the term. 63 However, the court continued the
Title II of the federal Civil Rights Act of 1964. This statute has been applied to recrea
tional organizations which claimed they were private clubs not open to the public at large.
The courts found that despite their contentions to the contrary, these clubs offered mem
bership to the public at large and could not exclude a particular class protected by the
statute. See Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298, 306-08 (1969) (recreational area which provided
a snackbar, swimming, boating, miniature golf, and dancing); Smith v. Young Men's Chris
tian Ass'n of Montgomery, 462 F.2d 634, 649 (5th Cir. 1972) (men's civic recreational
organization); Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n of Raleigh, N.C., 397 F.2d 96, 100
(4th Cir. 1968)(yMCA health and athletic club). These cases held that segregation on the
ground of race, color, or national origin was illegal. Title II does not cover gender discrim
ination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982).
55. Slidell, 387 F. Supp. at 483.
56. Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 150 (1985).
57. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d
712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984).
58. CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988). The Unruh Civil Rights Act
provides in part: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and equal, and no
matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other
physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advantages, facilities,
privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever." [d.
59. 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1983).
60. Id. at 718, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 328.
61. 40 Cal. 3d 72, 707 P.2d 212, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150 (1985).
62. Id. at 77, 707 P.2d at 215, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
63. As noted in Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal. 2d 463, 370 P.2d 313, 20
Cal. Rptr. 609 (1962), a "business" is generally defined as a "calling, occupation, or trade,
engaged in for the purpose of making a livelihood [or profit] [sic] or gain." [d. at 468, 370
P.2d at 316, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 612 (quoting Mansfield v. Hyde, 112 Cal. App. 2d 133, 137,
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trend towards a broad construction of public accommodation statutes
and subjected these organizations to the requirements of the public
accommodation law.
Both the Curran and Isbister courts noted that the legislature
passed the Unruh Act in response to prior judicial decisions which
improperly limited the meaning of "place of public accommodation"64
and intended in its 1959 revision to expand, not restrict, the scope of
the statute. 65 Focusing on the words "all" and "of every kind whatso
ever" in referring to business establishments, the courts held that
"business" included both commercial and non-commercial entities. 66
Thus, despite their claims of being non-profit organizations exempt
from the statute, both the Boy Scouts and the Boys' Club fit within a
broad definition of a "business establishment. "67 Since both organiza
tions were open to all male youth and made no attempt to restrict or
select members on any basis other than sex or sexual preference,68 they
were public accommodations, forbidden by the Unruh Act from dis
criminating against a protected class. 69 These two California cases
further exemplify the trend to extend the coverage of public accommo
245 P.2d 577, 581 (1952». The courts examined whether the club and the scouts as public
recreational organizations were removed from the commercial world and therefore outside
the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 78-79, 707 P.2d at 215-16, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 153-54; Curran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 729, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
64. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 78,707 P.2d at 215, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 153; Curran, 147 Cal.
App. 3d at 728, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 335. According to the Isbister court; appellate courts
inappropriately limited the term "place of public accommodation" in Long v. Mountain
View Cemetery Ass'n, 130 Cal. App. 2d 328, 278 P.2d 945 (1955) (private cemetery not
covered); Reed v. Hollywood Professional School, 169 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 887, 338 P.2d
633 (1959) (private school not covered); and Coleman v. Middlestaff, 147 Cal. App. 2d
Supp. 833, 305 P.2d 1020 (1957) (dentist's office not covered). Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 78-79,
707 P.2d 215-16, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 154.
65. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 78, 707 P.2d at 215,219 Cal. Rptr. at 153; Curran, 147 Cal.
App. 3d at 728, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 335. Nevertheless, the courts had yet to determine
whether the phrase "business establishments" also included public accommodations and
amusements of the' pre-1959 statute. Curran and Isbister held that the legislature, in adopt
ing the phrase "in all business establishments of every kind whatsoever," intended to go
beyond, but not preclude, the earlier statutory public accommodations. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d
at 78, 707 P.2d at 215-16,219 Cal. Rptr. at 153; Curran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 728, 195 Cal.
Rptr. at 335.
66. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 82-83, 707 P.2d at 218, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 156-57; Curran,
147 Cal. App. 3d at 729, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 335.
67. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 83, 707 P.2d at 219, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 157; Curran, 147 Cal.
App. 3d at 730, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
68. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 81, 707 P.2d at 217-18, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 155; Curran, 147
Cal. App. 3d at 723-24, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 331-32.
69. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 91, 707 P.2d at 224-25, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 162-63; Curran,
147 Cal. App. 3d at 734, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 339.
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dation statutes. 70
3)

Businessmen's Associations

Another series of cases in the early and mid-1980's addressed the
question of whether certain businessmen's associations were public
-accommodations. 71 These cases posed an even greater challenge to the
courts than did the athletic team or boys' clubs sex discrimination
cases for three main reasons. First, it was not obvious whether men's
associations offered goods and services,72 and under the statutes, estab
lishments typically are public accommodations only if they offer
goods, services, facilities, privileges, or advantages to the public. 73
Secondly, businessmen's associations varied more among them
selves than did boys' clubs or athletic teams. The purpose, activities,
and membership requirements were particular to each businessmen's
club. Some had a permanent site at which to gather, while others were
more like the Little League and alternated their meeting places. 74
Some specified extensive criteria before admitting members, while
others permitted entrance so long as the male applicant paid the mini
mal dues. 75 Some opened their activities to the public while others did
not. 76 As a result of these differences among businessmen's associa
70. Moreover, Isbister illustrates the court's intention to protect women from dis
crimination in places of public accoinmodation. As a sex discrimination decision, Isbister
was a case of first impression, holding that girls had a right of equal access to such clubs.
Prior cases dealing with boys' clubs involved racial discrimination. See Smith v. Young
Men's Christian Ass'n of Montgomery, 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972); Nesmith v. Young ,
Men's Christian Ass'n of Raleigh, 397 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1968)."
71. See Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App.
3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Cal: Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987); Kiwanis
Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986); United States Jaycees v.
McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
"
"
72. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305
N.W.2d at 772.
73. See infra note 86 for Minnesota's definition of "place of public accommodation."
See supra note 58 for California's Unruh Act.
74. The Jaycees have "oft-shifted sites" for their local chapter meetings. McClure,
305 N.W.2d at 772. But see Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. SUpp.
1182, 1203 (D. Conn. 1974) (all-male association met at the local lodge).
75. Compare Kiwanis, 806 F.2d at 473-74 (local club, faced with expulsion from the
international organization when it contravened the group's constitution by admitting wo
men, was a private club because it had definite criteria for the screening and" selection of
members), with McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 771 (the Jaycees had no standards for the admis
sion of new members).
76. Opening participation to the public is consistent with achieving the broad pur
poses of some groups. For example, the objective of the Jaycees is to pursue" 'such educa
tional and charitable purposes as will promote . . . development of young men's civic
organizations in the United States ... [and] particip!ltion by young men in the affairs of
their community, state and nation.''' Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 612
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tions, courts were precluded from applying a blanket rule. Instead,
they scrutinized the characteristics and practices of each club before
determining whether it was a public accommodation. 77
Finally, the courts also confronted the argument that enforce
ment of the accommodation statute against the association violated
the groups' right to freedom of association. 78 Though the latter claim
is properly a federal issue,79 the state courts nevertheless interpreted
their state statutes in light of this first amendment concern.
In United States Jaycees v. McClure 80 and Rotary Club ofDuarte
v. Board ofDirectors ofRotary International,8l women brought actions
against the organizations for excluding them from membership.82
Both cases resolved the issue of whether the organization was a "place
of public accommodation" by focusing on the conduct of the organiza
tions,83 the nature of the goods and privileges they offered to the pub
13 (1984) (quoting Bylaw 2-1 of the United States Jaycees (1978-79) from Brieffor Appel
lee 2).
Similarly, the purposes of the Rotary Club are international and necessitate wide par
ticipation. Rotary International defines itself as " 'an organization of business and profes
sional men united worldwide who provide humanitarian service, encourage high ethical
standards in all vocations, and help build goodwill and peace in the world.''' Rotary Club,
178 Cal. App. 3d at 1044, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (quoting MANUAL OF PROCEDURE 7
(1981), MANUAL OF PROCEDURE 7 (1978) of International Rotary, a non-profit organiza
tion composed of local Rotary Clubs).
77. The court in McClure rejected the plaintiff's suggestion that the court view the
Jaycees as analogous to the Kiwanis International Organization, a private club. McClure,
305 N.W.2dat 771. "[W]e [must] look at what this national organization is by itself." Id.
78. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); Board of Directors of
Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S.Ct. 1940 (1987). These decisions addressed
the conflict between the states' efforts to eliminate sex discrimination against women and
the constitutional freedom of association claimed by members of male organizations. See
infra Part I, Section D, 2.
79. Freedom of association is protected by the first amendment of the constitution.
See infra notes 123-27 and accompanying text for the relationship between the right of
freedom of association and the first amendment.
80. 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
81. 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 107 S. Ct.
1940 (1987). In affirming the California Court of Appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that requiring California Rotary Clubs to admit women under the state's Unruh Civil
Rights Act did not violate the clubs' first amendment rights of freedom of private associa
tion or of expressive association. See infra Part I, Section D, 2.
82. The Jaycees welcomed women to all their functions but only admitted women as
associate members. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 773. The Rotarians permitted women to
attend meetings, give speeches, receive awards, and form auxiliaries, but denied women
membership. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1941.
. 83. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1048, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 219; McClure, 305
N.W.2d at 768, 772.
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lic,84 and the criteria required for them to satisfy the private club
exemption. 8s
In determining the meaning of "place of public accommodation,"
the Supreme Court of Minnesota in McClure noted that the phrase
"whose goods ... privileges [and] advantages ... are sold or otherwise
made available to the public"86 of the state's public accommodation
statute focuses on the types of conduct or activity carried on by the
establishment rather than on the physical site of the establishment. 87
Defining a place of public accommodation by the term "whose" in
stead of "where" emphasizes the conduct in which discrimination is
unlawful rather than the kinds of sites where discrimination is unlaw
ful. 88 The California Court of Appeal in Rotary Club also stressed the
activity of the club rather than its geographical site. 89 An establish
ment "includes not only a fixed location, such as the 'place where one
is permanently fixed for residence or business,' but also a permanent
'commercial force or organization' or 'a permanent settled position (as
in life or business).' "90
In examining the conduct of the Jaycees and the Rotarians, these
courts determined that the organizations were public accommodations
because they offered goods or privileges to the general public. 91 Ac
cording to both courts, the organizations provided substantial business
benefits to their members in the form of leadership skills, business con
tacts, and employment promotions. 92 The courts held these benefits to
84. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. 227; McClure, 305
N.W.2d at 772.
.
85. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1058-59, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27; McClure,
305 N.W.2d at 770.
86. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(18) (West 1966 & Supp. 1988). The Minnesota
statute defines "place of public accommodation" as "a business, accommodation, refresh
ment, entertainment, recreation, or transportation facility of any kind, whether licensed or
not, whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are ex
tended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public." Id.
87.. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 768, 772.
88. Id.
89. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1048,224 Cal. Rptr. at 219.
90. Id. (quoting O'Connor v. Village Green Owners Ass'n, 33 Cal. 3d 790, 795, 662
P.2d 427, 430, 191 Cal. Rptr. 320, 323 (1983».
91. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305
N.W.2d at 772.
92. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305
N.W.2d at 772. Similarly, the purpose of New York City'S Local Law 63, upheld by the
U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225
(1988), was to ensure that clubs do not categorically exclude women and minorities from
membership in "organizations where business deals are often made and personal contacts
valuable for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed."
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be privileges and advantages offered by the club. 93
Having found that the Jaycee and Rotary Clubs were places of
public accommodations,94 the courts rejected the organizations' argu
ments that they were private establishments exempt from the statutes'
coverage. 9S Prior courts had enumerated certain minimum standards
to determine whether a club was public or private for purposes of the
accommodation statutes. 96 The main criteria include the selectivity
with which new members are admitted or the formality of membership
procedures and the existence of limits on the size of the membership.97
In adopting these criteria, both the Minnesota Supreme Court
and the California Court of Appeal found the Jaycee and Rotary
Clubs to be public, rather than private. 98 With a recruitment policy
stressing quantity, not quality, the Jaycees made no effort to be selec
tive of members and placed no limit on the size of clubs' member
ship.99 This zealous concern for an unselective and ever-growing
Id. at 2230 (quoting the New York City Council's statement in Local Law No. 63 of 1984,
§ I, App. 14-15 (1984».
93. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305
N.W.2d at 772.
94. Courts in two states and the District of Columbia have found that the United
States Jaycees was not a place of public accommodation. See United States Jaycees v.
Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 391 Mass. 594,463 N.E.2d 1151 (1984);
United States Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1983); and United States
Jaycees v. Bloomfield, 434 A.2d 1379 (D.C. App. 1981). As noted in the Reply Brief for
the Defendant by Susan Bartholomew at 13, Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America
Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352
(1987), the statutes in these states all retain the list approach to define "place of public
accommodation." Id. This may account for their literal rather than broad interpretation
of the statute.
95. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305
N.W.2d at 770-71.
96. Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F.2d 96, 101·02 (4th Cir. 1968);
Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203 (D. Conn.
1974); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1970). The district court
.
in Cornelius summarized these criteria in the following list:
(a) the selectiveness of the group in the admission of members; (b) the existence
of formal membership procedures; (c) the degree of membership control over in
ternal governance, particularly with regard to new members; (d) the history of the
organization, [for example], was it created or did it make insubstantial changes in
its prior operation in order to avoid the impact of civil rights legislation?; (e) the
use of club facilities by non-members; (f) the substantiality of dues; (g) whether
the organization advertises; [and] (h) the predominance of profit motive.
Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. at 1203 (citations omitted).
97. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 770. See supra note 96 for additional criteria estab
lished by the courts.
98. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1058-59,224 Cal. Rptr. 226-27; McClure, 305
N.W.2d at 770-71.
99. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 771.
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membership undermined the Jaycees' claim to be a private organiza
tion. loo Likewise, the high membership turnover in the Rotary Club
and the lack of "continuous, personal and social" relationships among
Rotarians precluded them from being a private club.101
These businessmen's association cases broadened the scope of the
public accommodation statutes in two ways. First, they underlined
the importance of the organization's conduct rather than its physical
locus.102 Secondly, the courts expanded their respective statutes to in
clude less material goods such as employment skills, benefits, and
promotions. 103
D.

Limitations On The Public Accommodation Statute

Broadening public accommodation statutes to include athletic
teams, boys' clubs, and businessmen's associations presents the hazard
of over-expanding the statutes. 104 In general, laws prohibiting dis
crimination recognize and address the problem of over-enforcement lOS
by exempting certain groups and activities from their coverage and
permitting discrimination by these exempted groups and activities.106
100. Id. See also Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir.
1986). The same criteria applied to the Kiwanis Ridgewood Club led the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals to conclude that it was not a place of public accommodation since it had
a selective, non-public membership policy. Id. at 475.
101. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1058-59,224 Cal. Rptr. at 226-27.
102. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1048, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 219; McClure, 305
N.W.2d at 768, 772.
103. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059, 224 Cal. Rptr. at 227; McClure, 305
N.W.2d at 772.
104. Over-expanding statutes creates the hazard of including within their scope
otherwise permissible discrimination. If the boundary of the statutes as established by their
text, case law, and policy considerations is not properly delineated, then all discrimination
becomes prohibited even though this proscription violates the challenger's greater compet
ing rights. Thus, a danger of over-enforcement exists unless "[t]he determination of the
scope of coverage of the statutes defines a boundary, a place where the prohibition against
discrimination ends and permission to discriminate begins." Stonefield, Non-Determinative
Discrimination. Mixed Motives. and the Inner Boundary 0/ Discrimination Law, 35 BUF
FALO L. REV. 85,96 (1986).
105. Stonefield, supra note 104, at 99-104.
106. For example, the Fair Housing Act generally prohibits discriminatory rental
practices but exempts small landlords from its coverage. 42 U.S.c. §§ 3601-3619 (1982).
A building occupied by the owner and meant to house no more than four families is exempt
from the statute's coverage. This exemption reflects the law's esteem for personal auton
omy which both enhances social welfare and is itself a moral value. Stonefield, supra note
104, at 100-01.
The federal employment statute permits employers of a small number of people to
discriminate with impunity. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1982) holds that a person with fewer
than fifteen employees is not technically an "employer" for purposes of the statute.' .
Religious organizations in specific circumstances may also lawfully discriminate under
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This section examines countervailing limitations to the public ac
commodation statutes' scope by looking at examples of arguably per
missible discrimination against prospective members of various
associations. These restrictions derive from two distinct sources: a
concern with the "privateness" of private institutions and the implica
tions of the constitutional right to freedom of association. Should the
public accommodation statute be extended to include volunteers, an
alternative examined in Part III, these two limitations would apply
equally to them.

1) Private Institutions
The public accommodation laws of many states exempt private
institutions from their coverage and permit private establishments to
discriminate without penalty.107 However, the statutes generally do
not list those institutions which qualify for the private exemption. !Os
the federal act. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1982). This statute permits religious organiza
tions to employ individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the
organization's activities. See also 42 U.S.c. § 2000e-2(e)(2) (1982) which permits a reli
gious school to hire employees of a particular religion; 42 U.S.c. § 3607 (1982) which
permits religious organizations to rent non-commercial dwellings to persons of the same
religion.
107. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1441.2 (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2502 (1981
& Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 18-7302 (1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 5-103(A)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988); IOWA CODE ANN. § 601A.2 (West 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1002(h) (1986); Ky. REV. STAT. § 344.130 (MichielBobbs-Merrill 1983); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 49B, § 5 (1986 & Supp. 1988); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 37.2303 (West
1985); NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-\38 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651.060 (Michie
1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(9)
(McKinney 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, § 1401 (West 1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.675(2) (1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 954(1) (purdon 1964); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11
24-3 (1981); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 4-21-501 (1985); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-30) (1987 & Supp.
1988); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.04(2) (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
108. For example, New Jersey's statute states: "Nothing herein contained shall be
construed to include or to apply to any institution, bona fide club, or place of [public]
accommodation, which is in its nature distinctly private." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-5(1)
(West 1976 & Supp. 1988).
Similarly, the District of Columbia's statute states that a place of public accommoda
tion "shall not include any institution, club, or place of accommodation which is in its
nature distinctly private." D.C. CODE ANN. § 1·2502 (1981 & Supp. 1988).
A 1984 amendment to New York City's Local Law 63 specified criteria necessary to
qualify as a private club. Any "institution, club or place of public accommodation," other
than a benevolent order or religious corporation, "shall not be considered in its nature
distinctly private if it has more than four hundred members, provides regular meal service
and regularly receives payment ... directly or indirectly from or on behalf of nonmembers
for the furtherance of trade or business." N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-102(9) (1986). This city
ordinance was declared constitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York Club Ass'n
V. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988), and may influence states to incorporate simi
lar distinguishing characteristics in their public accommodation statutes.
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The courts, therefore, have established a number of criteria by which
to determine whether an organization is private within the context of a
public accommodation statute. 109 The most important factors include
the selectivity in admission of members and the existence of limits on
the size of membership. I 10
These factors, hence, measure the privateness of an institution
and determine whether an establishment is a public accommoda
tion. III The requirement that a public accommodation be open to the
public "undermines the significance of the private club exemption ....
[T]he exemption adds nothing to the statute and is substantively su
perfluous."ll2 In exempting the private institution, legislatures only
seem to have specified what was not a public accommodation without
restricting the statutes' scope in any way.113 Since the private exemp
tion does not substantively alter the statute, it always is implicitly
present in the statute, even if not expressly stated, and sets no new
limit to the statutes' coverage. 114
The courts have noted that the purpose of the exemption is to
safeguard the right of freedom of association. I IS It permits organiza
109. Nesmith v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 397 F.2d 96, 101-02 (4th Cir. 1968);
Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182, 1203 (D. Conn.
1974); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. 1143, 1153 (S.D. Tex. 1970). See supra note 96
for a summary of the factors established by these courts.
110. McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 770. For further criteria, see supra note 96.
111. The courts "provide criteria for deciding ... whether a group is private or
public." McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 770 (emphasis added). Whether an entity is private or
whether it is public is one question judged by the same standards. In McClure, when dis
cussing the existence of limits on the size of membership, the court noted that the Jaycees
invited an "unscreened, unselected, and unlimited number of persons" to their meetings.
Id. at 773. See also National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127
N.J. Super. 522, 530, 318 A.2d 33, 37 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974)
(Little League was a place of public accommodation because it was nonselective of its mem
bers and invited the public at large to join); Isbister v. Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc., 40
Cal. 3d 72, 81, 707 P.2d 212, 217, 219 Cal. Rptr. 150, 155 (1985) and Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d 712, 732-33, 195 Cal. Rptr.
325, 337 (1983), appeal dismissed, 468 U.S. 1205 (1984) (both boys' clubs were public ac
commodations because they were open to all male youth and made no attempt to be selec
tive in the admission of members); Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary
Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 1058-59,224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 227 (1986) ("Rotary literature
states that '[e]very Rotary club must have its windows and doors open to the whole
world.' ").
112. Note, The Private Club Exemption to the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Study in
Judicial Confusion, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1112, 1120 (1969).
113. Id. at 1120-21.
114. The Connecticut Public Accommodation Statute lacks an express private insti
tution exemption. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-63(1), 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986).
115. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163,171 (1971) (private clubs have
a right "to choose members upon a discriminatory basis."); Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296,
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tions of a truly private character to discriminate in the selection of
their members because of each individual's underlying right to freely
associate. In fact, an accommodation statute which included private
establishments within its scope could be attacked on constitutional
grounds. The right to freedom of association respects "the right of the
individual to pick his own associates so as to express his preferences
and dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and
groups as he chooses."116 Since the private exemption was added to
stress the individual's right to freedom of association, it is necessary to
examine whether this right poses any limitations to the public accom
modation statutes.

2) Constitutional Right to Freedom of Association
The United States Supreme Court, in Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, I 17 balanced Minnesota's interest in prohibiting discrimination
through its public accommodation statute against the Jaycees' right to
freedom of association. In pursuing its analysis, the Court identified
two distinct constitutional interests, the freedom of intimate associa
tion and the freedom of expressive association,118 and held that the
enforcement of the state's public accommodation statute to compel the
Jaycees to accept women as members did not infringe upon either in
terest. 119 Although the constitutional right to freely associate did not
limit the application of the public accommodation statute to the
Jaycees, the following sections examine whether in certain circum
stances the constitutional right of freedom of association might limit
the statute's scope.
a)

Intimate Association
The right of intimate association protects "the formation and

298 (1966) (it "is the right of the individual to pick his own associates so as to express his
preferences and dislikes, and to fashion his private life by joining such clubs and groups as
he chooses."); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) ("Inviolability of privacy in
group association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom
of association ...."); Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp. .1143,1157 (S.D. Tex. 1970) ("If
the government were allowed to regulate the membership of truly private clubs, private
organizations, or private associations, then it could determine for each citizen who would
be his personal friends and what would be his private associations, and the Bill of Rights
would be for naught.").
116. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 298 (1966) (dictum); Cf Griswold v. Connecti
cut, 381 U.S. 479,483 (1965) (right to select one's intimate associates free from governmen
tal intrusion).
117. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
118. Id. at 617-18.
119. Id. at 621, 626-29. See infra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
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preservation of certain kinds of highly personal relationships" best ex
emplified by the family as an association that is intimately linked and
that requires personal choices for its creation and sustenance. 120 To
establish a right to freedom of association based on privacy and inti
mate association, a group must be private. 121 Thus, an organization
which is categorized as a public accommodation does not qualify as an
intimate association. 122 Therefore, virtually by definition, a public ac
commoda,tion cannot assert a constitutional right of freedom of inti
mate association. The scope of the public accommodation statute and
of the right to intimate' association are mutually exclusive, and the
freedom of intimate association, in and of itself, should never limit the
application of a public accommodation statute.
b)

Expressive Association

A right of expressive association exists only when linked to an
expressive activity. 123 Association for its own sake is not constitution
ally protected; 124 Rather, freedom of expressive association is related
120, Roberts, 468 U,S. at 618. A constitutional right of intimate association attend
ing the creation and sustenance of a family regards marriage, Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S.
374 (1978), childbirth, Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), child rear
ing and education, Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816 (1977); Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), cohabitation with one's relatives, Moore v. East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), and contraception, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965).
121. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619-20.
Family relationships, by their nature, involve deep attachments and commitments
to the necessarily few other individuals with whom one shares not only a special
community of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but also distinctively personal
aspects of one's life. Among other things, therefore, they are distinguished by
such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to
begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of
the relationship. As a general matter, only relationships with these sorts of quali
ties are likely to reflect the considerations that have led to an understanding of
freedom of association as an intrinsic element of personal liberty.
Id.
See also Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 147 Cal. App.
3d 712,730, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 336 (1983) ("[T]hose with a common interest may associ
ate exclusively with whom they please only if it is the kind of association which was in
tended to be embraced within the protection afforded by the rights of privacy and free
association. "). In Cornelius v. Benevolent Protective Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D.
Conn. 1974), the district court upheld the private club defense established by the defendant
and stated: "To have their privacy protected, clubs must function as extensions of mem
bers' homes and not as extensions of their businesses." Id. at 1204. See supra note 96 and
accompanying text for the judicially-created criteria characterizing a private establishment.
122. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 620.
123. Id. at 627.
124. Marshall, Discrimination and the Right ofAssociation, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 68, 73
(1986) ("Association qua association did not implicate the first amendment.").
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to first amendment rights.
An individual's freedom 'to speak, to worship, and to petition the
government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously
protected from interference by the State unless. a correlative free
dom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guar
anteed.... Consequently, we have long understood as implicit in
the right to engage in activities protected by the First Amendment a
corresponding right to associate with others in pursuit of a wide
variety of political, social, economic,educational, religious, and cul
tural ends}25

Thus, the right of expressive association safeguards the ability of mem
bers to express "those views that brought them together."126 The
Court often has recognized that in a pluralistic society, association and
organization are necessary for effectively advancing ideas and
beliefs. 127
While as so interpreted; the first amendment to the Constitution
protects the right to associate for expressive purposes, this right is not
absolute. 128 A state may infringe upon it "by regulations adopted to
serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas,
125. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622.
126. Id. at 623.
127. See Citizens Against Rent Control Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454
U.S. 290 (1981).
[T]he practice of persons shanng common views banding together to achieve a
common end is deeply embedded in the American political process. The 18th
century Committees of Correspondence and the pamphleteers were early exam
ples of this phenomena [sic] and the Federalist Papers were perhaps the most
significant and lasting example. The tradition of volunteer committees for collec
tive action has manifested itself in myriad community and public activities; in the
political process it can focus on a candidate or on a ballot measure. Its value is
that by collective effort individuals can make their views known, when, individu
ally, their voices would be faint or lost.
Id. at 294.
See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (non-violent ele
ments of politically-motivated boycott were entitled to protection under the first amend
ment); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (solicitation of prospective litigants by nonprofit
organization that engages in litigation as a form of political expression and association
constituted expressive association entitled to first amendment protection); Abood v. Detroit
Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (right under first amendment of non-union employees
not to associate with collective bargaining agent in communication of ideas).
128. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
"Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly contro
versial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more
than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of
speech and assembly." This is not to say, however, that in every setting in which
individuals exercise some discrimination in choosing associates, their selective
process of inclusion and exclusion is protected by the Constitution.
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that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of
associational freedoms."129
The state has a compelling interest in eliminating discrimina
tion.130 However, the state cannot pursue this interest if it results in
the suppression of the association's expressive activity. 131 Suppression
occurs when there is a "direct relation between membership exclusion
and the organization's advocacy."132 A group may engage in an ex
pressive activity which is changed in some degree if an excluded class
is included, yet fail to qualify for protection under the right to expres
sive association. For example, in Roberts, the Jaycees argued that the
admission of women would alter their political positions and influ
ence 133 while a recreational club in Daniel v. Pau/ 134 contended that
black members would change their club's attendance and activities. 13s
Nevertheless, the organizations' expressive activities were not pro
tected under the constitutional right of expressive association from the
states' application of their anti-discriminatory legislation.
The state's intervention must suppress, not incidently alter, the
New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2234 (1988) (quoting
NAACP v. Alabama ex reI. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958».
129. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
130. Id. at 625. The state's interest in eliminating discrimination rests on its obliga
tion to protect citizens from
serious social and personal harms .... [D]iscrimination based on archaic and
overbroad assumptions about the relative needs and capacities of the sexes forces
individuals to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to
their actual. abilities. It thereby both deprives persons of their individual dignity
and denies society the benefits of wide participation in political, economic, and
cultural life .... That stigmatizing injury, and the denial of equal opportunities
that accompanies it, is surely felt as strongly by persons suffering discrimination
on the basis of their sex as by those treated differently because of their race.

Id.
In amending its Human Rights Law to prohibit discrimination in clubs that did not
properly fall under the statute's private exemption, the city of New York stated that its
compelling interest lay in providing all citizens with "'a fair and equal opportunity to
participate in the business and professional life of the city.''' New York State Club Ass'n
v. New York City, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 2230 (1988) (quoting Local Law No. 63 of 1984, § 1,
App. 14-15). This goal is frustrated by the "discriminatory practices of certain member
ship organizations where business deals are often made and personal contacts valuable for
business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed." Id..
131. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
132. Marshall, supra note 124, at 80.
133. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626-27.
134. 395 U.S. 298 (1969) (recreational club found to be a public accommodation and
enjoined from denying admission to blacks solely on racial grounds).
135. Id. at 300 n.2. At trial, the defendant stated: "'[W]e refused admission to
[blacks] because white people in our community would not patronize us if we admitted
Negroes to the swimming pool.' "Id. (quoting testimony).
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expressive goals of the association in order for the latter to claim a
constitutional right. 136 The organization's discriminatory criteria
must relate directly to its expressive activity for the group to be safe
guarded by the right to freedom of expression. 137 For example, a
white supremacist group's exclusion of blacks directly promotes its
ideological position. A public accommodation statute that required
the group to accept blacks would violate the group's right to expres
sive association. The same would apply to a Nazi association com
pelled to accept Jews. The very goal of the association would be
suppressed by the forced inclusion of the class it seeks to repress. Ad
ditionally, a radical women's group seeking to make men second-class
citizens would find its ideological goal countered by the acceptance of
male members. 138
The Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees 139 made
this same inquiry by examining whether the exclusion of women was
the fundamental purpose of the Jaycees. l40 Although the Jaycees ar
gued that their aim was the promotion of young men's interests, the
136. The Curran court stated:
Taking [the right to freedom of association] literally as "governing" would afford
protection to the most flagrant form of discrimination under the canopy of the
right of free association. The answer is, of course, that those with a common
interest may associate exclusively with whom they please only if it is the kind of
association which was intended to be embraced within the protection afforded by
the rights of privacy and free association.
Curran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 730, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 336.
137. The U.S. Supreme Court, in New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York,
108 S. Ct. 2225 (1988), stated:
It is conceivable ... that an association might be able to show that it is organized
for specific expressive purposes and that it will not be able to advocate its desired
viewpoints nearly as effectively if it cannot confine its membership to those who
share the same sex, for example, or the same religion.
Id. at 2234.
138. Under this analysis, the right of expressive association will limit public accom
modation statutes only in the rare instance when a minority person attempts to join or
volunteer services to an organization which seeks to eliminate the minority. Thus, in terms
of practical impact, a claim for protection under the constitutional right to freedom of
expression will seldom prevail over the state's anti-discriminatory interests.
139. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
140. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 627. Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opinion, suggested
a different test to determine the expressive rights of an association. Instead of adopting the
majority's test which balanced an association's claim against the interest of the intruding
state, Justice O'Connor focused on the commercial or expressive nature of the association.
If the association were commercial, the state could enforce its anti-discrimination statute; if
it was expressive, the association's right to freedom of expression would overcome the
state's interest. Id. at 633-36, 638 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor found the
Jaycees to be a commercial organization and therefore agreed that their first amendment
claim failed. Id. at 639-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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Court found that the organization did not primarily advance a gender
specific goal through its charitable and civic activities. 141 . Since the
admission of women would not prevent the Jaycees from engaging in
its principal activities or from disseminating its views,142 Minnesota's
public accommodation statute did not violate the Jaycees' right of ex
pressive association. 143
Association based on ethnicity or religion might present constitu
tional problems in certain circumstances. Where the purpose of a His
panic heritage club or a Jewish fellowship group is to preserve its own
culture or religion, the group may successfully claim a fundamental
expressive goal which would be destroyed by the enforcement of anti
discriminatory statutes. In many cases, the issue raised by the ·chal
lenges of these groups would be resolved by statutory construction,
and the constitutional issue would not be presented. Where the as
sociations are classed as private institutions, they would fall outside
the statute's scope and would be free to discriminate. However, when
ethnic or religious associations are public accommodations, they may
still have a constitutional right to expressive association.
In evaluating that right, a significant difference exists between, for
example, an all-French group and a non-French group. Those ex
cluded from the latter are stigmatized, whereas tho·se denied member
ship to the former suffer no significant ethnic rejection. The ethnic
group inflicts no stigma on the excluded classes for two reasons. First,
the nationality requirement in the ethnic group is more likely to be
perceived as a means for preserving and fostering that group's culture
rather than as a means of excluding classes subject to prejudice. Sec
ondly, the many classes excluded from an ethnic group form a cate
gory that is both too large and too diverse to suffer any real stigma. 144
Thus, the state has a compelling interest in eliminating.exclusion
ary groups which are open to all but specific nationalities. 145 . On the
141. Id. at 627.
142. Id. at 610. "There is no basis in the record for concluding that admission of
women as full voting members will impede appellee's ability to engage in its constitution
ally protected civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activities or to disseminate
its preferred views." Id.
143. If a public accommodation statute does not require an organization to alter its
basic purpose, the statute is not unconstitutional. Rotary Int'l, 107 S. Ct. at 1947-48. See
National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318
A.2d 33 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974) (req~iring Little League to admit
girls under the public accommodation statute did not necessitate that the league cease play
ing baseball, the league's specific purpose, and engage in other sports activities).
144. Marshall, supra note 124, at 98-99.
145. Id. at 99 ("The state interest, in short, is in seeing that any identifiable group is
not singled out for adverse treatment.").
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other hand, it is in the state's interest to foster associations which limit
membership to a specific nationality for the purpose of preserving and
promoting a particular heritage. 146 Each culture has its treasures that
enrich the whole. "Cultural pluralism enriches the national culture,
not only through the development of individuality, but also through
diverse celebrations, traditions, communities, and heritage that form
our national identity."147
Thus, because the discrimination which results from ethnic or
religious associations does not cause a stigmatizing evil and, because
the government has a positive interest in protecting cultural pluralism,
the state cannot demonstrate a compelling intere~t in eliminating the
otherwise invidious discrimination by such groups. Without a com
pelling interest to eliminate discrimination in groups that foster their
own heritages, the state cannot lawfully apply the public accommoda
tion statute to them. These ethnic and religious groups can claim a
right of expressive association. Consequently, in certain circum
stances, the constitutional right of freedom of association can limit the
scope of a state's public accommodation statute. 148

II.

QUINNIPIAC COUNCIL, Boy SCOUTS OF AMERICA, INC V.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND OPPORTUNITIESI49

When refused a scoutmaster position because of her sex, Cathe
rine Pollard, relying on these prior judicial interpretations of other
states' public accommodation statutes, ISO had a number of reasons to
146. Sengstock & Sengstock, Discrimination: A Constitutional Dilemma, 9 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 59, 123-24 (1967).
147. Marshall, supra note 124, at 88.
148. Of course, certain associations might characterize themselves as ethnic or reli
gious as a pretext to engage in some unrelated activity. An all-Catholic or all-Jewish asso
ciation whose principal activities are bowling and golf has. nothing to do with the
preservation of a religion. Associations with no central practices which promote cultural
or religious heritages should be put to the same test as others claiming a right to expressive
association. This test prohibits exclusionary discrimination that does not directly affect the
association's .expressive activity. These superficially cultural or religious associations would
not be granted constitutional protection because their discrimination has nothing to do
with perpetuating a heritage.
149. 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (1987).
150.. . Id. at 297-99, 528 A.2d at 359. The court cited Kiwanis Int'l v. Ridgewood
~iwanis Club, 806 F.2d 468 (3d Cir. 1986); Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of
Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d 1035, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 107 S.
Ct. 1940 (1987); United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981); Na
tional Organization of Women v. Little League Baseball, 127 N.J. Super. 522, 318 A.2d 33
(1974), aff'd, 67 ~.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974).
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expect relief under the similar Connecticut statute. lSI Cases in other
jurisdictions supported both her contention that public accommoda
tion statutes apply to membership organizations which are non-selec
tive in their invitation to participate and that such application is
constitutional. ls2
Beginning with Little League, the courts consistently have held
that a place of public accommodation was not limited to a fixed site. IS3
Thus, the fact that the Boy Scouts gathered at various locations did
not exclude them from being a public accommodation. ls4 As also·
noted in Little League, an organization is a public accommodation if it
offers advantages and goods on the basis of a general invitation to
join. ISS Therefore, considering the Boy Scouts' open, broad, and ag
gressive recruitment policy, including the use of the mass media, a
positive finding that they offered their services to the general public
was likely.ls6 Furthermore, Isbister and Curran precluded the Boy
Scouts from escaping the statutes' coverage because of their non-profit
character. ls7
Pollard's claim also appeared to be an offshoot of the business
men's association cases where the courts held that the "goods" which
were wrongly denied women included leadership skills and promotion
opportunities. ISS It seemed plausible that the leadership skills ac
151. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-63(1), 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986). See supra
Section I, B for the history of this statute.
152. See supra Section I, C and D for a discussion of these cases.
153. National Organization for Women v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J.
Super. 522,530,318 A.2d 33, 37 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320, 338 A.2d 198 (1974) (founda
tion case establishing that a public accommodation need not have a specific geographical
area). See supra notes 42 to 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Little League.
See also Rotary Club of Duarte v. Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 178 Cal. App. 3d
1035, 1048,224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 219 (1986); Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy
Scouts of Am., 147 Cal. App. 3d 712,729, 195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 335 (1983), appeal dismissed,
468 U.S. 1205 (1984); United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305 N.W.2d 764, 768, 772 (Minn.
1981).
154. The Boy Scouts provide their services in a variety of physical locations includ
ing schools, churches, firehouses, campsites, and private homes. Hearing Examiner's
Memorandum at 19, Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352.
155. Little League, 127 N.J. Super. at 530, 318 A.2d at 37 (1974), aff'd, 67 N.J. 320,
338 A.2d 198 (1974).
156. Hearing Examiner's Memorandum at 21, Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287,
528 A.2d 352.
157. Isbister, 40 Cal. 3d at 82-84, 707 P.2d at 218-20, 219 Cal. Rptr. at 156-58; Cur
ran, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 729-30, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 335-36. See supra notes 56-70 and
accompanying text for a discussion of these two cases. The Boy Scouts' major source of
funding is "public giving through United Way." Hearing Examiner's Memorandum at 32,
Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352.
158. Rotary Club, 178 Cal. App. 3d at 1059; McClure, 305 N.W.2d at 772.
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quired from serving as scoutmaster and from training programs would
similarly fall into the category of goods, privileges, and advantages,
and that, therefore, under the public accommodation statute, the Boy
Scouts could not deny voluntary leadership positions on a discrimina
tory basis.
In Roberts,159 the Supreme Court had stated that there are two
types of constitutional rights that can limit the application of the pub
lic accommodation statute: a right of association based on intimate
personal relationships, and a right to associate for expressive pur
poses. l60 The admission of a qualified woman as scoutmaster did not
appear to overstep either of these limits. A Boy Scout troop was not
apparently the kind of highly personal association protected by the
right of intimate association from unjustified interference by the state;
nor would a woman as scoutmaster seem to suppress the goals of the
Boy Scouts to train and educate youth. A male-only policy is not a
goal set forth by the scout law in the way a white-only policy is the
aim of the Ku Klux Klan. The installation of a woman as scoutmaster
might incidentally alter the method of formation but, as discussed
above,161 such insubstantial changes would be insufficient to protect
the Boy Scouts under the right of expressive association. 162
The Connecticut Supreme Court carefully considered this judicial
background against which Quinnipiac Council arose. Nevertheless, it
noted that the particular issue for decision was different from that
presented in prior cases. In those cases, the defendant organizations
had refused plaintiffs access to goods and services offered to the public.
In Quinnipiac Council, the defendant organization denied plaintiff, not
its services, but the opportunity for the plaintiff to offer her services to
159. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text for a dis
cussion of this case.
160. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-18. See supra notes 120-48 and accompanying text for
a discussion of these constitutional rights.
161. This facet of the right of freedom of association is discussed in supra notes 132
43 and accompanying text.
162. The court in Quinnipiac Council stated:
Although we need not reach those constitutional issues today, we note that those
arguments have little merit in light of the United States Supreme Court's recent
decisions in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), and Board of
Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 107 S. Ct. 1940 (1987). In
both cases, the Supreme Court held that even if a public accommodation law
infringes slightly on the constitutional rights of expressive association, that in
fringement is justified because such statutes serve a compelling state interest in
eliminating discrimination.
QUinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 293 n.5, 528 A.2d at 356 n.5.
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the organization. 163 Thus, the central issue in Quinnipiac Council was
whether the proffer of services is an accommodation within the mean
ing of the Connecticut statute.
A)

Facts

In 1974 and in 1976, the defendant, Catherine Pollard, applied to
Quinnipiac Council for a commission as Scoutmaster of Boy Scout
Troop 13 of Milford, Connecticut. l64 On both occasions, she. was re
fused on the ground that certain volunteer positions, such as scout
master, were limited exclusively to men. 165
.
Pollard's scouting skills were undisputed. In the years ·prior to
her applications, Pollard had accumulated extensive experience in the
Quinnipiac Council's scouting program. She had been a cub scout den
mother, music merit badge counselor, and committee member of
Troop 13. 166 From 1972 to 1976, when Troop 13 lacked an official
scoutmaster, she served as its de facto scoutmaster. The scouting pro
gram flourished under her d,irection; the boys in her troop advanced,
and five attained the rank of eagle scout. 167
After rejection of her second application, Pollard filed a com
plaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Op
portunities in December of 1976, alleging discriminatory public
163. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360.
164. Although the Boy Scouts permitted women to assume numerous leadership
roles (see infra note 193), they did not allow women to become scoutmasters, assistant
scoutmasters, webelos den leaders, assistant webelos den leaders, lone scout friends, 'or
.
counselors. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 291, 528 A.2d at 355., '
In February of 1988, tl,le Boy Scouts voluntarily opened these positions to women.
The organization's withdrawal of its all-male requirement for the posi~ion of scoutmaster
does not preempt the issue raised by Quinnipiac Council. The anti-discriminatory statutory
protection available to volunteers remains uncertain and a relevant concern.
.
165. Id.at 290-91,528 A.2d at 355. On April 29, 1974, the Chief Scout Executive of
the Boy Scouts of, America rejected Catherine Pollard's application in the following letter:
Your request to be commissioned as a scoutmaster is difficult to turn down. The
credentials you present are all commendable. We feel that the boy of scouting age
looks to a man to establish his own standards of character. It is my obligation to
adhere to this policy and thereby not authorize your request.
Hearing Examiner's Finding of Fact 9 in the Memorandum of the Hearing Examiner of the
Comm. on Human·Rights and Opportunities at 5, Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528
A.2d 352.
166. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 290, 528 A.2d at 355.
167. Id. An eagle scout is defined as "a boy scout who has been awarded 21 merit
badges." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 713 (unabr. 1971). An eagle scout
is a "boy scout of highest rank." FUNK & WAGNALLS STANDARD COLLEGE DICTIONARY
414 (6th ed. 1977).
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accommodation practices. 168 In a January, 1984, decision, the Com
mission's Hearing Examiner held that the Boy Scouts had violated the
Connecticut public accommodation statute and required them to offer
the position of scoutmaster to Catherine Pollard. 169 In May of 1986,
after finding that the Hearing Examiner had misconstrued the stat
ute,170 the Superior Court of Connecticut reversed the Examiner's de
cisionPI Catherine Pollard appealed the decision to the Appellate
Division. Subsequently, the Connecticut Supreme Court transferred
the appeal to itself. 172
B)

Issues Decided

The Connecticut public accommodation statute defines "place of
public accommodation, resort, or amusement" as "any establishment
which caters or offers its services or facilities or goods to the general
public .... "173 The initial question in Quinnipiac Council, thus, was
whether the organization was a "place of public accommodation"
within the meaning of the statute. 174
Chief Justice Peters, writing for the court, began by examining
the Connecticut statute's language, legislative history, and remedial
168. Hearing Examiner's Memorandum at 6, Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287,
528 A.2d 352 (1987).
169. Id. at 34.
170. The Hearing Examiner found that the Boy Scouts organization was open to the
public and constituted a "place" within the meaning of the statute. Hearing Examiner's
Memorandum at 19-21, Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528· A.2d 352. Given these
findings and declining to limit the application of the public accommodation statute to com
mercial, business, and profit-oriented organizations, the Hearing Examiner held that the
Boy Scouts was a public accommodation and violated the public accommodation statute
when it rejected Pollard's application solely on the basis of her female gender. [d. at 20, 28
29,34.
The trial court reversed the conclusion of the Hearing Examiner, holding that the term
"establishment" in the state's public accommodation statute "was intended· to encompass
'every possible type of business imaginable' but not 'a singular, unique, eleemosynary insti
tution' like the Boy Scouts of America." Quinnipiac CounCil, 204 Conn. at 291, 528 A.2d
at 355. Furthermore, the trial court determined that the "position of scoutmaster doeS not
fall within the rubric of 'services,' 'goods' or 'facilities' and hence is not a 'public accommo
dation.''' Id. at 291-92, 528 A.2d at 355.
171. The Superior Court's Memorandum of Quinnipiac Council (Chernauskas, J.),
May 19, 1986.
172.. The Connecticut Supreme Court, pursuant to Conn. Rules of Court § 4023
(1988), has the authority to transfer any appeal from the Appellate Division to itself.
173. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-63(1) (West 1986).
174. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 295, 528 A.2d at 357. Since the court re
solved that the proffer of services was not an accommodation, it never reached the issue of
whether the Boy Scouts had denied Pollard "full and equal accommodations in any place of
public accommodation, resort or amusement ... because of ... sex ...." CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 46a-64(a)(I) (West 1986).
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purpose.1 75 The court first concluded that a physical site was not re
quired in order to be a place of public accommodation. 176 Drawing on
the similar Minnesota statute that was applied broadly in United
States Jaycees v. McClure,177 the court held that the Connecticut stat
ute "now regulates the discriminatory conduct and not the discrimina
tory situs of an enterprise which offers its services to the general
public." 178
The court next examined whether the Boy Scouts' admittedly dis
criminatory refusal to accept Pollard as a scoutmaster was an unlawful
public accommodation practice. 179 Unlawful discrimination occurs
when an "establishment" which serves "the general public" withholds
its goods and services from a member of a protected class. 180 Thus, in
order to discriminate in violation of the public accommodation stat
ute, an organization must first satisfy the statutory definition of
"establishment. "
The court found that the term "establishment" includes business,
commercial, non-profit, and private entities. 181 The key factor in de
termining whether an organization is an "establishment" is whether it
is held open to the public. 182 Thus, any service provider, regardless of
its organizational status, is an "establishment" if it is open to the gen
eral public. 183 Even a private organization which has no obligation to
175. See supra section I, B.
176. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 298, 528 A.2d at 358.
177. 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text
for the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of that state's public accommodation
statute.
178. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 298, 528 A.2dat 358. The court did not
elaborate on this interpretation but referred to United States Jaycees v. McClure, 305
N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981), whose interpretation was found to be constitutional in Roberts
v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Minnesota statute.
179. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 298, 528 A.2d at 358.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 300, 528 A.2d at 359. The statute does not limit establishments to busi
nesses, nor does it make any exceptions for private organizations. Unlike Connecticut's
public accommodation statute, the California accommodation statute only lists "business
estaolishments." It states: "All persons within the jurisdiction of this state are free and
equal, and no matter what their sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blind
ness or other physical disability are entitled to the full and equal accommodations, advan
tages, facilities, privileges, or services in all business establishments of every kind
whatsoever." CAL. CIV. CODE § 51 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988).
Certain states exempt private establishments, without defining them, from their public
accommodation statutes. See supra note 107.
182. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 300, 528 A.2d at 359.
183. The Quinnipiac Council court illustrated the meaning of organizational status
by the following examples. "A hospital ... cannot refuse its services to a member of the
general public simply because the hospital is a nonprofit corporation. . . . Similarly, a
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offer its services to all becomes bound by the public accommodation
statute once it eschews selectivity.184 Therefore, to determine whether
an organization is subject to the statute, it is necessary to analyze the
facts of each case.
The court, therefore, closely examined the facts in QUinnipiac
Council and focused on whether the proffer of services was an "accom
modation." In response to Pollard's argument that the Boy Scouts
had denied her access to an "accommodation" when they refused her
the opportunity to give of her services, the court held that the statute
does not protect the volunteering of services. 18s "[A] statute that ad
dresses a discriminatory denial of access to goods and services does not,
on its face, incorporate an allegedly discriminatory refusal by an enter
prise to avail itself of a claimant's desire to offer services." 186 Accord
ingly, the court held that the Boy Scouts did not violate the statute
in the statute's awkward terms, did not deprive Pollard of an accom
modation-in refusing her the opportunity to serve as scoutmaster of
Troop 13.
C)

Issues Not Decided

Although rejecting the public accommodation claim as not cov
ered by the statute, the court suggested, without deciding, that the
state's employment discrimination statute 187 might protect those prof
fering their services from discrimination. 188 The court deeJIled it "es
pecially significant" that the employment statute contained an express
exception for a "bona fide occupational qualification or need"
(BFOQ),189 which would permit employers to discriminate if they
private university that opens its theater facilities for the entertainment of the general public
cannot refuse admission for reasons ... made illegal by [§ 46a-64(a)(I)]." /d. at 299, 528
A.2d at 359.
184.. Id.
185. Id. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360.
186. Id.
187. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-6O(a)(I) (West 1986). Connecticut's Unfair
Employment Practice statute states:
It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (I) For an em
ployer, by himself or his agent, except in the case 0/ a bona fide occupational
qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to bar or to discharge from
employment any individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or in
terms, conditions or privileges of employment because of the individual's race,
color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or
past history of mental disorder, mental retardation or physical disability, includ
ing, but not limited to, blindness.
Id. (emphasis added).
188. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360.
189. Id. The court stated: "A review of our labor legislation discloses that our Gen
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could meet the heavy burden of proving that such discrimination was
necessary to the operation of the business. 190
.
The Boy Scouts asserted this exception as part of their defense. 191
They justified the male-only scoutmaster position on the need of boys,
ages ten to fourteen, for a male role model. 192 The Boy Scouts claimed
that their general policy regarding women in leadership positions did
not manifest gender discrimination since they invited women to as
sume numerous leadership positions. 193 However, for this particular
position and for this particular age group, the Boy Scouts argued that
their sex requirement was a BFOQ.194
Since the court decided that volunteering of services was not pro
tected by the statute,195 it did not reach, and thus did not fully evalu
ate, the BFOQ issue.' Moreover, because the accommodation statute
does not contain an express BFOQ exception, it could not be asserted
as a defense for violation of the public accommodation statute. How
ever, the court did note that the BFOQ appears "to be as relevant to
voluntary services as it is to paid employment,"196 and that a BFOQ
provision would provide the proper framework for evaluating the or
ganization's claim that the boys' need for male role models permitted
it to refuse the services of a talented woman. 197 Since a BFOQ provi
eral Statutes treat employment discrimination separately from public accommodation dis
crimination. We deem it especially significant that only the former statute contains an
express exception for a 'bona fide occupational qualification or need.' " Id.
190. See infra Section IV for a more detailed discussion of BFOQ.
191. Although the Boy Scouts did not place a BFOQ label upon their argument, the
court acknowledged it as such. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 293, 302, 528 A.2d at
356,360, see Brief for Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. at5, 7, Quinnipiac
Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352.
192. Brief for Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. at 5, 7, QUinnipiac
Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352. The Boy Scouts offer three general categories of
scouting programs: Cub Scouting, Boy Scouting, and Exploring. The Cub Scouts program
is open to girls and boys ages eight through ten. The Explorer program admits both male
and female teenagers from age fourteen years upwards. However, the Boy Scouts program
for ages ten through fourteen is open only to boys. Id. at 3-4.
193. Id. at 6-7. At the time Quinnipiac Council was decided, women were allowed to
be Cubmaster, Assistant Cubmaster, Den Leader Coach, Den Leader, Assistant Den
Leader, Explorer Advisor, Associate Explorer Advisor, Lone c;ub Scout Friend and Coun
selor, Council Commissioner, Assistant Council Commissioner, District Commissioner,
Assistant District Commissioner, Unit Commissioner, Roundtable Commissioner, and
Roundtable Staff Member. Hearing Examiner's Memorandum of Quinnipiac Council at 9.
See supra note 164 for the positions that were closed to women.
194. Brief for Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. at 5, 7, Quinnipiac
Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352; Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 293, 302, 528
A.2d at 356, 360.
195. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360.
196. Id. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360.
197. Id.
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sion does exist in the employment statute but not in the public accom
modation statute, the court stated that it "is more consistent with a
legislative intent to leave such practices to be regulated by statutes that
address employment discrimination rather than by statutes directed to
discrimination in public accommodations."198
Quinnipiac Council leaves an important question unanswered: in
the future, should volunteers bring their discrimination claims under
the employment statute rather then under the public accommodation
statute? Addressing this issue involves a two-fold examination. It first
requires, in Part III, evaluating Quinnipiac Council and determining
whether this decision should be rejected in favor of continuing the pre
vious expansive judicial interpretations of the public accommodation
statutes, either by adopting a different interpretation of the statutory
language or by amending the statute itself. The question then necessi
tates, in Part IV, exploring the appropriateness of protecting volun
teers from discrimination under the employment statute as the
Connecticut Supreme Court suggested.
III.

PROTECTION FOR VOLUNTEERS UNDER THE PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATION STATUTE

While the Connecticut Supreme Court in Quinnipiac Council
ruled that the proffer of services was not an accommodation under the
Connecticut public accommodation statute, an amended statute,199 or
a different interpretation of the same statute, would yield a different
result. Several states, excluding Connecticut, have public accommo
dation statutes which contain the words "privileges" and "advan
tages."200 In United States Jaycees v. McClure,201 the Minnesota
Supreme Court interpreted these words as meaning, among other
things, that: "[l]eadership skills are 'goods,' business contacts and em
ployment promotions are 'privileges' and 'advantages' ...."202
Using this new language and its broad construction, a court prop
erly could regard the Boy Scouts' training in adult leadership skills as
a "good," and the opportunity to serve as scoutmaster as a "privilege"
and "advantage." From this perspective, Pollard's personal fulfill
198. Id.

199. See infra note 203 for a suggested amended statute.
200. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 51-52 (West 1982 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 363.01 to 363.03 (West 1966 & Supp. 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-5.1 to 10:5-12
(West 1976 & Supp. 1988). See supra note 86 for the full text of the Minnesota statute and
note 58 for the full text of the California statute.
201. 305 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1981).
202. Id. at 772.
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ment from the position of scoutmaster is a good, a privilege, and an
advantage, each fully protected by the public accommodation
statute. 203
A revised interpretation of the existing Connecticut public ac
commodation statute would likewise afford protection for volunteers.
The opportunity to serve could be considered a goOd. 204 Volunteers
offer their services because of the sense of fulfillment and reward that
comes from gratuitous giving. The satisfaction derived from serving
others is, at least for the volunteer, a good. 205 Thus, the term "goods"
in the present statute could be interpreted to include these non-mate
rial benefits. The addition of the terms "privileges and advantages" to
the Connecticut public accommodation statute would clarify and sup
port this broadened interpretation of the term "goods."
This analysis illustrates that it is possible to enlarge the meaning
of goods, privileges, and advantages to include the proffer of services.
However, broadening the definition of these terms in an effort to en
compass volunteers within the public accommodation statute may vio
late the statute's intended purpose. As noted by the Quinnipiac
Council court, the public accommodation statute focuses on the pro
tected class' access to goods and services. 206 It primarily safeguards
recipients of goods and services against discrimination. 207 On the
other hand, profferers or providers of services compose the class pro
tected by the employment statute. For this reason, enlarging the con
cept of goods, privileges, and advantages to encompass the proffer of
203. An amended statute as suggested in the text would read: "A place of public
accommodation ... means any establishment which caters or offers its services or facilities
or goods or privileges or advantages to the general public ...." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-63(1) (West 1986) (suggested amendments italicized).
204. See Brief for Defendant by Susan Bartholomew at 28, Quinnipiac Council, 204
Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352 (opportunity to become a scoutmaster and to work with young
members between the ages of ten and fourteen on various projects and activities are
"goods" denied women).
205. "[A] volunteer [is] ... an individual engaging in behavior ... that is essentially
(primarily) motivated by the expectation of psychic benefits of some kind as a result of
activities that have a market value greater than any remuneration received for such activi
ties." Smith, Altruism, Volunteers, and Volunteerism, in VOLUNTEERISM IN THE EIGHTIES
25 (J. Harman ed. 1982). See also Van Til, Volunteering and Democratic Theory, in
VOLUNTEERISM IN THE EIGHTIES 211 (J. Harman ed. 1982) ("[V]olunteering ... repre
sents a significant contribution to the volunteer's own psychological health and self-actuali
zation.") (quoting E. SCHINDLER-RAINMAN & R. LIPPITT, THE VOLUNTEER
COMMUNITY: CREATIVE USES OF HUMAN RESOURCES 15 (1975».
206. Quinnipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 301, 528 A.2d at 360.
207. Id. "[A] statute that addresses a discriminatory denial of access to goods and
services does not, on its face, incorporate an allegedly discriminatory refusal by an enter
prise to avail itself of a claimant's desire to offer services." Id.
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services goes beyond the intent and nature of the public accommoda
tion statute. It is an attempt to include a class traditionally protected
by the employment statute. The distinct purposes of the public ac
commodation statute and employment statute correctly prompted the
Quinnipiac Council court to refer volunteers to the employment
statute.
The Quinnipiac Council court also found it significant that the
accommodation statute lacked a BFOQ and regarded its presence in
the employment statute as an indicium that volunteers more appropri
ately fall under this latter statute. 208 As will become evident in the
next section, a BFOQ provision would permit directors to refuse vol
unteer services for job-related reasons essential for the organization's
operation. 209 If the public accommodation statute could apply to vol
unteers, it would transfer to them the private exemption and constitu
tional limits discussed in Part I. However, the statute would still fail
to represent the countervailing interest of volunteer organizers and di
rectors. In order to relieve organizations of the obligation of accepting
all volunteer services, a statute which protects volunteers must contain
a BFOQ exception. 210 The absence of this provision in the public ac
commodation statute is a second reason justifying Quinnipiac Coun
cil's recommendation that volunteers have recourse to the
employment statute for protection .against discrimination.
208. Id. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360. See supra notes 195-98 and accompanying text for
the court's discussion. .
209. See infra Section IV for a discussion of BFOQ and its application to volunteer
organizations.
210. In Big Brothers, Inc. and Rimarcik v. Minneapolis Comm. on Civil Rights, 284
N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 1979), the court held that Big Brothers was permitted to inquire into
the sexual preference of an adult male volunteer and to pass this information to mothers of
boys in the program. The Minnesota Civil Liberties Union (MCLU), in an Amicus Brief,
contended that
even if Big Brothers, Inc. is considered to be under the public accommodation
section, the prohibition against any inquiry [into plaintiff's sexual preference]
should still be required ... [because] in most public accommodation situations
inquiry does not occur. That is, a gas station attendant will not inquire as to one's
affectional preference before serving him.
Id. at 829 n.12.
This observation suggests that a BFOQ under the public accommodation statute
would be peculiar to volunteers proffering their services and usually would not apply to
persons receiving services from a public accommodation. The MCLU also noted that "the
relationship of Johnson [a volunteer] to Big Brothers, Inc. is analogized to the relationship
of a potential employee to an employment agency. Amicus thus conclude[d] that ... it is
impermissible for Big Brothers, Inc. to inquire into any of the protected criteria, including
affectional preference, without showing that the criteria [sic] is a bona fide occupational
qualification." Id. at 828-29. However, since the court found no discrimination, it had no
need to resolve the BFOQ issue. See infra note 214.
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PROTECTION FOR VOLUNTEERS UNDER THE
EMPLOYMENT STATUTE

A.

Bona Fide Occupational Qualification

Developed in employment discrimination statutes and case Jaw, Ii
BFOQ is a job-related qualification essential for a business' opera
tion. 211 An employer may refuse to hire an applicant if the exclusion
is based upon a BFOQ, that is, a performance-related condition which
would prevent the normal operation of the business. 212
The BFOQ exception is an affirmative defense raised by employ
ers only after the plaintiff has first proven unlawful employment dis
211. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states that it is unlawful for an em
ployer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (1982). However,
[n]otwithstanding any other provision[s] of this subchapter, ... it shall not be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees, ...
on the basis of ... religion, sex, or national origin in those certain instances where
religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reason
ably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(I) (1982).
Applying Title VII, courts have held that discrimination based on either religion, sex,
or national origin was permissible in certain circumstances because the imposed require
ment was a bona fide occupational qualification "necessary to the normal operation of that
particular business or enterprise." Id. Sumitomo Shoji America v. Avigliano, 457 U.S.
176, 189, n.19 (1982) (although the issue was not before the Court, the Court stated that
Japanese citizenship might be a BFOQ for certain positions at Sumitomo, a New York
based Japanese-controlled company); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 336-37 (1977)
(Alabama's regulation barring the hiring of women as guards in "contact" positions at the
state's maximum security male penitentiaries was a BFOQ); Phillips v. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (employer's requirement that female applicants not have
preschool age children was a BFOQ issue precluding summary judgment); Kern v.
Dynalectron Corp., 577 F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Tex. 1983) (requirement that pilot convert to
Islam was a BFOQ for job which necessitated flying over Mecca, a holy area prohibited to
non-Moslems under penalty of death), aff'd mem., 746 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1984); Pime v.
Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 585 F. Supp. 435 (N.D. Ill. 1984), aff'd, 803 F.2d 351 (7th Cir.
1986) (hiring Jesuits as philosophy professors was a BFOQ since that religious affiliation
was reasonably necessary for the normal operation of the Jesuit Catholic university).
The primary legislative intent underlying the equal employment statute of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 was to close the gap existing between the social and economic positions
of blacks and whites. President Kennedy stated that the federal equal opportunity legisla
tion would "help set a standard for all the Nation and close existing gaps." 109 CONGo
REc. 11,178 (1963). Consistent.with the statute's chief purpose of improving the status of
the black community, the BFOQ provision does not justify employment discrimination
based on race. 110 CONGo REc.· 2550-63 (1964). An amendment, proposed by Senator
McClellan of Arkansas, to include race and color as additional BFOQs was rejected as an
amendment that "would destroy the bill." 110 CONGo REc. 13,825 (1964).
212. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1982).
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crimination. 213 If the· plaintiff fails to prove discrimination, it is
unnecessary to inquire into the existence of a BFOQ.214 However, if
the plaintiff meets this burden, the employer can present a BFOQ de
fense, claiming that religion, nationality, or sex is a characteristic nec
essary for the successful performance of the job. 2IS Although the
BFOQ is often called an "exception,"216 it is "mote accurately de
scribed as 'justification' " for discrimination. 217
. In cases of sex discrimination,2ls there is either an "ability to per
form"BFOQ or a "same sex" BFOQ.219 Employers have claimed an
"ability to perform" BFOQ when they have been ~harged with dis
crimiriation for excluding women from physically strenuous jobs. 220

a

213. lurinko v. Edwin L. Wiegand Co., 477 F.2d 1038, 1043 (3d Cir. 1973), vacated
and remanded on other grounds, 414 U.S. 970 (1973); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488 F.2d
1333, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Hodgson v. First Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n, 455 F.2d
818, 822 (5th Cir. 1972); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th
Cir. 1969). .See also Sirota, Sex Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational
Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1026 (1977) ("Before the BFOQ provision becomes
relevant, a party must first prove ... discrimination by an employer.").
214. See Big Brothers, Inc. and Rimarcik v. Minneapolis Comm. on Civil Rights,
284 N.W.2d 823 (Minn. 1979). In Big Brothers, the court found no evidence of what it
termed "actual" discrimination because the plaintiff's sexual preference, like any other dis
tinguishing characteristic, was part of the information owed mothers of boys in the pro
gram. Consequently, the court did not consider the BFOQ exception. Id. at 828. See also
Voyles v. Ralph K. Davies Medical Center, 403 F. Supp. 456, 457 n.3 (N.D. Cal. 1975),
aff'd, 570 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1978); Bujel v. Borman Food Stores, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 141,
144 (E.D. Mich. 1974) (failure to prove discrimination made unnecessary an inquiry into
the existence of a BFOQ).
215. See supra note 211. The Congressional debates on Title VII's BFOQ exception
offered the example of a theology professor at a religious college as a religion BFOQ. Ar
guably, belief as well as knowledge is necessary for successful teaching of theology. On the
other hand, a janitorial position at a religious institution does not carry a religion BFOQ.
110 CONGo REc. 2585-93 (1964). For a nationality BFOQ, Congress gave the example of
an Italian chef at an Italian restaurant where the chef's nationality reflected on the busi
ness' success.ld. at 2549.
216. Dothard V. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977); Phillips V. Martin Marietta
Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545 (1971); Rosenfeld V. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1224 (9th
Cir. 1971); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 232 (5th Cir. 1969);
EEOC V. Spokane Concrete Prods., 534 F. Supp. 518, 523 (E.D. Wash. 1982).
217. Sirota, supra note 213, at 1026.
218. "[S]ex discrimination occurs when both men and women compete for a job, and
an employer discriminates against members of one sex on the basis of cultural stereotypes."
Id. at 1033.
219. B. LINDEMANN SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 341 (2d ed. 1983).
220. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) (agent-telegra
pher); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) (telephone
lineman); EEOC v. Spokane Concrete Prods., 534 F. Supp. 518 (E.D. Wash. 1982) (truck
driver); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969) (heavy-lifting general company jobs).
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The courts have held that employers cannot assume categorically that
a woman, because of her sex, cannot perform the particular work. 221
An employer may refuse an applicant on the basis of sex only upon
proof of that individual's incapacity of performance. 222
A job requiring "contact" with the client or customer- which
could potentially invade the latter's privacy may give rise to a "same
sex" BFOQ. In Fesel v. Masonic Home ofDelaware, Inc.,223 the court
upheld the employer's refusal to hire a male nurse's aid to attend fe
male nursing home patients. 224 The court in City of Philadelphia v.
Pennsylvania Human Relations·Comm. 22s permitted a juvenile center
to restrict youth supervisors, whose duties among others included su
pervision of bathing, to persons of the same gender as those being su
pervised. 226 An Oklahoma district court found a "same sex" BFOQ
for the labor and delivery room nursing staff, when the evidence
showed that male nurses caused harmful levels of stress in the women
giving birth. 227
Directors of volunteer organizations placed in similar situations
likewise should be able to assure the proper operation of their organi
zations and the privacy of their members through either a "same sex"
or an "ability to perform" BFOQ. However, protecting volunteers
under the present public accommodation statutes, which lack BFOQ
exceptions, would require a volunteer director to accept all gratuitous
services. 228 On the other hand, since a BFOQ exception exists in the
employment statutes, safeguarding volunteers under these statutes
221. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
408 F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969) stated that if "all or substantially all women" are incapable of
safely and efficiently performing the job's responsibilities then an employer can refuse every
woman applicant. Id. at 235. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Rosenfeld v. South
ern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971) adopted the narrower test proposed by Bowe v.
Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), aff'd in part. rev'd in part, 416
F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969), which necessitated an evaluation of the individual female appli
cant's ability to perform before permitting discrimination. Rosenfeld, 444 F.2d at 1225.
222. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 545-47 (1971); Rosenfeld v.
Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co.,
416 F.2d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1969).
223. 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd mem., 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979).
224. Id. at 1354. The nursing home refused to hire a male nurse's aid because the
size of the home would require him to be on duty alone during certain shifts and twenty
two of its thirty retired guests were females who often objected to male care.
225. 7 Pa. Commw. 500, 300 A.2d 97 (1973).
226. Id. at 513, 300 A.2d at 104.
227. EEOC v. Mercy Health Center, 29 FEP 159 (W.O. Okla. 1982).
228. More precisely, the public accommodation statutes make it unlawful for the
director to discriminate on the basis of protected characteristics. See supra note 23.
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would permit directors to reject volunteers for performance-related
incapacities.
Although arising in the context of employment, the case of Har
vey v. Young Women's Christian Ass'n 229 supports the application of a
BFOQ to volunteers, After the YWCA discharged her, a female em
ployee proved employment discrimination based on sex by showing
that her dismissal was due solely to her pregnancy.230 However, the
YWCA established that it discharged the plaintiff because she actively
sought to represent her condition of unwed pregnancy as an "alterna
tive lifestyle" to the club's female youth. 231 Since this role model was
contrary to the ideals and philosophy of the YWCA, the court held
that a legitimate reason existed for the employee's dismissaJ.232 The
dismissal based on sex was justified by non-discriminatory motives,
similar to a BFOQ, which made the termination lawful. If the woman
had been a volunteer of the YWCA, rather than an employee, the
same "ability to perform" BFOQ would, by analogy, also apply.
Litigating Quinnipiac Council under an employment statute
which protects volunteers would permit the Boy Scouts to assert the
"same sex" BFOQ defense and would thereby focus the decision on
their reasons for prohibiting women from serving as scoutmasters.
The Boy Scouts could then legally refuse Pollard's services only by
proving that being male was a BFOQ for the position of
scoutmaster. 233
229. 533 F. Supp. 949 (W.D.N.C. 1982).
230. Id. at 954. Dismissal based on pregnancy is prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)
(1982). See also Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987) (female
employee discharged under the club's rule prohibiting unmarried employees from becom
ing pregnant).
231. Harvey, 533 F. Supp. at 954-55.
232. Id. at 956.
233. The party claiming the BFOQ has the burden of proof. McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Weeks, 408 F.2d at 232. See also Note, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act 0/1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 388-89 (1976) (discuss
ing burden of proof in Title VII discrimination suits).
The requirements for proving a prima facie case of discrimination are established in
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). The applicant must show:
[1] that he belongs to a racial minority; [2] that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; [3] that, despite his qualifica
tions, he was rejected; and [4] that, after his rejection, the position remained open
and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's
qualifications.
Id. at 802.
In cases of "overt" discrimination where the defendant neither denies nor attempts to
hide the existence of discrimination, the plaintiff need not first prove a prima facie case of
discrimination before shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. See Bell v. Birming
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Thus, in such circumstances, the BFOQ arguments presented in
Quinnipiac Council, but not evaluated by the court, would become
central.234 The Boy Scouts justified their gende~ policy on the psycho
logical need of adolescent boys, in rapid physical and emotional devel
opment stages, for a male role model. 235 The Boy Scouts also claimed
that boys of scouting age who are just beginning to participate in activ
ities outside the family benefit greatly from association with 'a male
scoutmaster. 236 Moreover, with the number of households without a
father increasing, the Boy Scouts asserted that the policy of providing
boys with a male scoutmaster has even more importance. 237
Although the burden of proving a male-gender BFOQ would be a
heavy one,238 a BFOQ defense would focus the decision on the main
issue: whether the Boy Scouts wrongfully discriminated against Cath
erine Pollard when they denied her a scoutmaster position because of
her sex. 239 Instead of basing the legality of the discrimination on
whether the refusal of a volunteer position is an accommodation, the
court could base its decision on whether the rejection is justified by a
male-gender BFOQ. No matter how the BFOQ issue is resolved, the
ham Linen Serv., 715 F.2d 1552, 1556 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1204 (1984);
Stonefield, supra note 104, at 106-09.
Quinnipiac Council presents a case of "overt" discrimination because the Boy Scouts
admitted that their rejection of Ms. Pollard was based on sex. Their letter of refusal IS
direct evidence of discrimination and creates a presumption of unlawful discrimination.
See supra note 165.
234. Since Quinnipiac Council was litigated under the present public accommodation
statute, which lacks a BFOQ, the Boy Scouts' BFOQ arguments were irrelevant. Quin
nipiac Council, 204 Conn. at 293 n.6, 528 A.2d at 356 n.6. Thus, the court did not deter
mine "whether the plaintiff and its parent organization [were] justified or misguided in their
view that the desirability of male role models outweighs the value of the services that tal
ented women might provide to the boy scouts." Id. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360.
235. Brief for Quinnipiac Council, Boy Scouts of America, Inc. at 5, Quinnipiac
Council, 204 Conn. 287, 528 A.2d 352.
236. Id. at 4.
237. Id. at 5.
238. The Boy Scouts would have the burden of proving that the need for male role
models outweighed the value of the services of qualified women. Quinnipiac Council, 204
Conn. at 302, 528 A.2d at 360.
239. If the case had been decided by applying a BFOQ, Pollard could have relied on
a digest decision 'of the Equal Employment Opportunity Comm., EEOC Dec. LA. 68-4
538E, 2 FEP 537, 537-38 (1969), which held that the Head Start program's selection of a
man rather than a woman who had previously adequately fulfilled the position was unjusti
fied by the claim that the children needed a male image when the position involved mini
mum contact with the children. The Boy Scouts, however, might distinguish this case from
Quinnipiac Council because the children in Head Start were not adolescent boys whose
need for a male image is greater and because the position of scoutmaster may involve more
contact with the boys than a Head Start position.
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presence of a BFOQ serves a positive function by centering the deci
sion on the real issue.

6. Are Volunteers "Employees"?
In addition to the similarity between volunteers and employees
who both offer rather than receive services, the need for a BFOQ in a
statute protecting volunteers is another reason for advancing the em
ployment statute as the appropriate act under which to safeguard
those proferring their services. However, the employment statute will
properly protect volunteers only if they can be considered employees.
The definitions of "employees" offered by Congress and the legisla
tures fail to provide the distinguishing characteristics of employees. 240
An examination of judicial decisions reveals that, although courts are
divided on the issue, volunteers cannot clearly be regarded as employ
ees. 241 Nevertheless, for purposes of discrimination, those decisions
granting relief to volunteers under the employment statute appear
more judicially equitable. 242
The division among the courts as to whether volunteers are em
ployees stems from their emphasis on compensation of the person
rather than control over that person. Those courts which focus on the
fact that employees receive compensation for their services conclude
that volunteers are not employees. 243 On the other hand, courts which
stress the fact that employees work under the control and supervision
of an employer hold that volunteers are employees. 244
240. 42 u.s.c. § 2000e(f) (1982) defines "employee" in the following manner:
The term "employee" means an individual employed by an employer, except that
the term "employee" shall not include any person elected to public office in any
State or political subdivision of any State by the qualified voters thereof, or any
person chosen by such officer to be on such officer's personal staff, or an appointee
on the policy making level or an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of
the constitutional or legal powers of the office.
The definition provided by the Connecticut General Statutes is representative of other
states' definitions. The Connecticut legislature defined the term "employee" as "any person
employed by an employer but ... not ... any individual employed by his parents, spouse or
child, or in the domestic service of any person." CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-51(9)
(West 1986). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 1O:5-5(f) (West 1976 & Supp. 1988); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, § 954(c) (Purdon 1964 & Supp. 1988).
241. See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text for an analysis justifying this
position.
242. See infra notes 266-96 and accompanying text for a discussion of this position.
243. See infra notes 245-53 and accompanying text for the development and applica
tion of this characteristic.
244. See infra notes 254-62 and accompanying text for cases which support this
position.
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Compensation is a major factor that distinguishes employees from
volunteers who render their services gratuitously.24s The dictionary
definition of employee is "any worker who is under wages or salary to
an employer."246 Courts have noted that" 'An employee' ... means
someone who works for another for hire. "247 In Smith v. Berks Com
munity Television,248 the court emphasized the distinction between
paid and unpaid services and found no protection for volunteers under
the employment statutes. In Smith, the court decided the issue of
whether volunteers were "employees" within the meaning of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,249 and held that they were not. 2SO In the court's
view, the purpose of Title VII was to eliminate the loss or diminution
in one's means of livelihood because of that person's race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin. 2SI Employee status requires an economic
"relationship between the individual and the so-called principal"
which makes the individual "susceptible to the discriminatory prac
tices which the act was designed to eliminate. "2S2 Volunteers, being
unpaid, were not subject to the discrimination which the statute was
designed to prevent. They were not denied access to a means of liveli
hood and thus were not protected by the statute. 2S3
A separate group of cases involving volunteer firefighters, how
ever, held that volunteers were covered by the anti-discrimination stat
ute. 2S4 These cases relied on other factors which characterize
245. See Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers of America, Local Union No.1 v.
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chern. Div., 404 U.S. 157, 167 (1971); Smith v. Berks Commu
nity Television, 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987); Clorer v. Blessington, 19 N.J. Misc. 253,
18 A.2d 712 (1941).
246. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 743 (unabr. 1971).
247. Meyer Dairy, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Bd., 429 F.2d 697, 701 n.5 (10th
Cir. 1970). See People v. Kirstein, 6 Mich. App. 107, 114, 148 N.W.2d 539,543 (Ct. App.
1967).
248. 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
249. Id.; 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(e)-2000(h)-5 (1982).
250. Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 796.
251. Id. at 795.
252. Id. (quoting Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (6th Cir. 1983».
253. Id. at 795-96. See also Clorer v. Blessington, 19 N.J. Misc. 253, 18 A.2d 712
(1941), where the court likewise considered remuneration as the determining factor in dif
ferentiating an employee from a volunteer. The court held that the claimant, injured while
assisting the alleged employer in changing a truck tire, was an employee and not a volun
teer because he had received wages for his services. Id. at 255, 18 A.2d at 713.
254. Hebard v. Basking Ridge Fire Co. No. I, 164 N.J. Super. 77, 395 A.2d 870
(1978); Harmony Volunteer Fire Co. & Relief Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm.; 459 A.2d 439 (Pa. Commw. 1983); Shepherdstown Vol. Fire Dept. v. West Vir
ginia Human Rights Comm., 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983). These fire departments, like
the Boy Scouts with regard to Catherine Pollard, failed to accept the volunteered services
of qualified women, solely on the ground that they limited these positions exclusively to
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employees. They emphasized the fact that employees are under the
supervision and direction of an employer who controls the way the
work is done and has the power of discharge for non-performance. 255
In Harmony Volunteer Fire Co. & ReliefAss'n v. Pennsylvania Human
Relations Comm., 256 the court held that the volunteers of the fire de
partment were employees, notwithstanding the fact that they were un
paid.257 The court based its decision on the control which the
company had over its volunteer members. 258 The company selected
its own firefighters, had the power to discharge them for non-perform
ance, and directed both the work they did and the manner in which it
was accomplished. 259 In Hebard v. Basking Ridge Fire Co. No. 1,260
the court considered the fact that the fire department was a municipal
service funded by the town as relevant to the analysis of whether a
volunteer could be an "employee."261 This funding was another indi
cium of control, warranting the conclusion that volunteer firefighters
were employees both of the town and of the company and were thus
protected from discrimination by the employment statute. 262
The cases, though divided, complement one another and lead to a
better understanding of the necessity, and difficulty, of protecting vol
unteers under the employment statute. If the question is approached
purely theoretically, then, by the rules oflogic, volunteers are not em
ployees and do not fall under the employment statute. However, if the
issue is approached practically with an eye to dispensing justice, vol
unteers, because of the many likenesses they share with employees,
should be covered by the anti-discriminatory employment statute or a
similar act specifically enacted for volunteers.
males. The courts held that the women were covered by the employment statutes, that sex
was not a BFOQ, and that the companies had illegally discriminated against women.
255. Key Ins. Exch. v. Washington, 7 Cal. App. 3d 209, 212,86 Cal. Rptr. 542, 544
45 (1970); County of Erie v. Board of Trustees of Buffalo, 62 Misc.2d 396, 400, 308
N.Y.S.2d 515, 519 (1970). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220 (1984).
The definition of servant states: "A servant is a person employed to perform services in the
affairs of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the performance of the
service is subject to the other's control or right to control." Id.
256. 459 A.2d 439 (pa. Commw. 1983).
257. [d. at 442. In Shepherdstown Vol. Fire Dept. v. West Virginia Human Rights
Comm., 309 S.E.2d 342 (W. Va. 1983), the court reached the same conclusion but under
the state's public accommodation statute. The court found that the volunteer fire depart
ment was a "place of public accommodation[ )" which had denied equal rights to women
because of sex. Id. at 351, 353-54.
258. Harmony Volunteer Fire Co., 459 A.2d at 442.
259. [d.
260. 164 N.J. Super. 77, 395 A.2d 870 (1978).
261. [d. at 83-84, 395 A.2d at 873.
262. [d.

136

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 11:93

Falling under the first approach, the cases which involve volun
teer firefighters focused on the likeness between volunteers and em
ployees263 without considering the compensation characteristic 'which
distinguishes the two classes. 264 However, it is a general rule oflogic
that a species is distinguished from another species by its differentiat
ing characteristics. 265 The fact that volunteers and employees both
work under the control and superVision of an employer does not mean
that volunteers are employees; it merely means that they have a simi
lar characteristic, which must be considered along with the differenti
ating characteristic, the fact that volunteers receive no remuneration
from the employer for their services. The conclusion of the cases in
volving the "volunteer" firefighters appears supportable only if one be
lieves that this differentiating characteristic is unimportant to the
meaning of the term "employee," a proposition which both the dic
tionary definition and longstanding case law. make hard to accept.
Despite the fact that volunteers are not technically employees and
consequently should fall outside the scope of the employment statute,
there are several policy reasons for protecting volunteers under the
employment statute. First, volunteers presently have no anti-discrimi
nation statution protection; second, the purpose of the employment
statute is not limited to pecuniary discrimimition;266 and finally, vol
unteers share many likenesses with employees.
At present,· there exists no legislation which specifically safe
guards volunteers against discrimination. 267 Nevertheless, it is impor
263. There are other similarities between volunteers and employees that have not
been noted in the cases. Sociologists note that voluntarism is frequently the road to em
ployment. Women volunteer in order to consider the possibility of returning to work, and
men thinking of second careers volunteer in order to experiment in a new area of interest.
See Schwartz, The Rights of Volunteers: A Response, in VOLUNTEERISM IN THE EIGHTIES
73 (J. Harmon ed. 1982). Educators emphasize the value of career insights which teenagers
acquire by volunteering. See THE VOICES OF VOLUNTEERS (R. Williams ed. 1980).
264. See supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of cases which
support this as a distinguishing characteristic between employees and volunteers.
265. Aristotle, Categories, ch. 3, THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (1941). For ex
ample, to determine whether cats are dogs, one examines their distinguishing, not their
similar, characteristics. Simply because both cats and.dogs are four-footed does not mean
that cats are dogs; the differences are more telling than the likenesses.
266. See infra notes 272-91 and the accompanying text for a discussion of the other
purposes of the employment statu~e.
267. The Connecticut employment statute, however, could be amended to include
volunteers. The suggested statute would state:
It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section: (1) For an em
ployer or volunteer director, by himself or his agent, except.in the case of a bona
fide occupational qualification or need, to refuse to hire or employ or to accept
volunteer services or to bar or to discharge from employment or voluntarism any
individual or to discriminate against him in compensation or in terms, conditions
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tant that volunteers be protected against discrimination which "both
deprives persons of their individual dignity and denies society the ben
efits of wide participation in political, economic, and culturallife."268
Without this legislative protection, members of a minority class volun
teering their services to the local library could be refused merely on
account of their race or national origin. A hospital could deny a
candy stripe position to a male teenager on the grounds that the work
is more appropriate to women, or a male judge could .refuse a judicial
internship to any female applicant because of the judge's conviction
that the practice of law is not appropriate for women. Discriminatory
conduct thus is illegal if practiced against employees but legally per
missible if practiced against volunteers. Yet, because the same "stig
matizing injury" which accompanies the denial of equal
opportunities269 ensues, and no statute facially includes volunteers as a
protected class, the employment statute is presently the most appro
priate act under which to safeguard volunteers against discrimination.
The Smith court stressed only one of the purposes of the employ
ment statute. 270 The court focused on the statute's purpose to ensure
an equal opportunity to a livelihood and to forbid disparities in income
due to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Since volunteers
are unaffected by discriminatory practices which bar access to a liveli
hood or which result in a diminution of income, the court concluded
that volunteers were not protected by the employment statute. 271
However, "Congress did not intend to confine the scope of [the
employment statute] simply to instances of discrimination in pecuni
ary emoluments."272 Employment discrimination exists equally when
some people are treated less favorably than others in the "terms, con
ditions, or privileges of employment, because of ... race, color, reli
gion, sex, or national origin."273 This discrimination can occur when
or privileges of employment or voluntarism because of the individual's race, color,
religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past
histc?ry of mental disorder, mental retardation or physical disability, including,
but not limited to, blindness ....
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 46a-6O(a)(I) (West 1986) (suggested amendments italicized).
268. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 625.
269. Id.
270. The Smith court stated that the purpose of the employment legislation was to
eliminate the loss or diminution in a person's livelihood because of race, color, sex, religion,
or national origin. Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795. See supra notes 248-53 for a detailed dis
cussion of Smith.
271. See supra note 253 and accompanying text for the court's decision.
272. Rodriguez v. Board of Education of Eastchester Union Free School Dist., 620
F.2d 362, 366 (2d Cir. 1980).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982). For the full text of this federal statute, see
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protected classes are subject to a hostile working environment,274 are .
denied promotion opportunities,275 insurance276 and retirement bene
fits,277 pregnancy leaves,278 or are unjustifiably discharged. 279 Thus,
employers violate the employment statute if they refuse minority
workers promotion opportunities or equal working' conditions despite
the fact that they hire them at a wage comparable to their counter
parts. The purpose of the employment statute, consequently, extends
to eliminating inequality in non-monetary forms of compensation. It
prohibits all forms of discriminatory treatment even if that conduct
supra note 211. The Connecticut employment statute further protects the categories of age,
ancestry, present or past history of mental disorder, mental retardation, and physical disa
bility, including but not limited to blindness. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-6O(a)(I)
(West 1986). See supra note 187 for the full text of the Connecticut statute.
274. "[T]he phrase 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment' in [Title VII] is
an expansive concept which sweeps within its protective ambit the practice of creating a
working environment heavily chargCd with ethnic or racial discrimination." Rogers v.
EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
Courts have applied this principle to hostile working environments due to race,
Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality V. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977); Gray V. Greyhound Lines, East, 545 F.2d 169, 176
(D.C. Cir. 1976), to religion, Compston V. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976);
Young v. Southwestern Savings and Loan, 509 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1975), to national origin,
Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir. 1977), and to sex,
Zabkowicz V. West Bend Co., 589 F. Supp. 780 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
275. See Hishon V. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (eligibility for promotion to
a partner in a law firm was a "term, condition, or privilege" of employment granted to
those hired as associates); Lee v. Conecuh County Bd. of Educ., 634 F.2d 959 (5th Cir.
1981) (employer disregarded black male's superior job-related qualifications in promoting
others lacking the same).
276. Wambheim v. J.C. Penney Co., 642 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 467
U.S. 1255 (1984) (employer practice of providing dependent coverage only to persons
deemed "head of household" resulted in sex discrimination because only 37% of females as
opposed to 95% of males qualified for dependent coverage); EEOC v. Fremont Christian
School, 609 F. Supp. 344 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (religious school's policy of providing health
insurance only to full time "head of household" employees, whom it believed could only be
male, was invalidated).
277. City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978) (employer violated Title
VII by requiring female employees to make larger contributions than males to the pension
benefit plan).
278. Greenspan V. Automobile Club of Michigan, 495 F. Supp. 1021, 1049-50 (E.D.
Mich. 1980) (discrimination occurs when pregnant employees are forced to terminate
rather than take sick leave); In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. Maternity Benefits Litig., 602
F.2d 845 (8th Cir. 1979) (policy which guaranteed reinstatement to all those returning
from disability leave except women disabled by pregnancy was a discriminatory practice).
279. Slack V. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975) (black employees wrongly dis
charged when they refused to do work not required of similarly situated white employees);
Lowry v. Whitaker Cable Corp., 348 F. Supp. 202, (W.D. Mo. 1972) (employer's numerous
premature warnings and departure from normal practices showed racial discrimination in
discharge), aff'd, 472 F.2d 1210 (8th Cir. 1973).
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denies no pecuniary advantage. 28o
Volunteers receive a benefit analogous to the promotion opportu
nities afforded employees. The experience which volunteers acquire
from proffering their services is, in many instances, the first step to
employment or to a better volunteer position. 281 The denial of the
opportunity to gain this experience is similar to refusing an employee
promotion opportunities; both suffer a discrimination which the broad
purpose of the employment statute seeks to eliminate.
Directors of volunteer organizations, like employers, can also
subject minority classes to a hostile working environment. In an effort
to discourage minority workers from applying or remaining, such or
ganizations can harass them with discriminatory intimidation, ridi
cule, and insult. Such conduct, whether practiced against a volunteer
or against an employee, fosters and perpetuates the same discrimina
tion in the workplace proscribed by the employment statute and is
equally "repugnant, unworthy, and contrary to . . . national
policy."282
Both volunteers and employees are also susceptible to unjustified
discharges. Dismissed under pretext, these discharges heavily pollute
the working and recreational environment with discrimination and
substantially destroy the emotional and psychological well-being of
minority classes,283 a harm which legislatures intended to eradicate
with employment statutes. 284
As noted above in the BFOQ discussion,285 the employment stat
ute was not aimed at assuring a job to everyone irrespective of their
abilities. Nevertheless, it was intended "to eliminate artificial and ar
bitrary standards bearing no relationship to a person's job perform
ance."286 Employers who reject applicants with arrest records,287
280. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). "[T]he language of
Title VII is not limited to 'economic' or 'tangible' discrimination. The phrase 'terms, con
ditions, or privileges of employment' evinces a congressional intent 'to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women' in employment." Id. at 64 (quoting
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194, 1198 (9th Cir. 1971).
281. See supra note 263.
282. Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002, 1012
(E.D. Pa. 1970), ajJ'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
283. Rogers V. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972).
284. Id.
285. See supra Part IV, Section A.
286. Boyce V. Safeway Stores, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 402, 404 (D. D.C. 1972).
287. Gregory V. Litton Systems, 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972) (denial of employment
because of arrest record had illegal discriminatory effect on blacks); Carter v. Gallagher,
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convictions of crimes which have no relation to the work,288 dishonor
able military discharges,289 or poor credit records 290 violate the em
ployment statute which proscribes not only open discrimination but
also conduct which may seem fair, but which has a discriminatory
effect on minorities. 291 Similar capricious and prejudicial require
ments could provoke a director to tum away a volunteer from associa
tions such as the Senior Citizens Club, the Historical Society, the
Ukrainian Youth Association, or the Hospital Auxiliary. Because the
employment statute aims at eliminating these discriminatory practices,
its relief should extend to volunteers.
The court in Smith not only failed to consider the secondary pur
poses of the employment statute which apply equally to volunteers, it
also, by focusing only on the difference of paid and unpaid services
between employees and volunteers, overlooked a number of additional
similarities between the two classes. 292 Both groups not only proffer
services, they are also selected and trained by a director or an em
ployer;293 both do work which is supervised and controlled;294 and
both can be discharged for non-satisfactory performance. 295 Stressing
these considerable likenesses rather than singling out the difference
tips the balance in favor of considering volunteers eligible for protec
tion under the employment statute. 296
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (injunction against inquiry into arrest records), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972).
288. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975) (practice of
refusing consideration for employment to persons convicted of a crime other than minor
traffic offense disqualified black applicants at a significantly higher rate than whites).
289. Dozier v. Chupka, 395 F. Supp. 836, 850 (S.D. Ohio 1975) (court invalidated
bonus points for honorable discharge).
290. Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974) (employer's policy of
discharge for two garnishments in one year disproportionately subjected blacks to dis
charge); Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America, 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971) (employer
prohibited from discharging a black person solely because his wages had been garnished to
satisfy judgments).
291. See Cloherty, Discriminatory Employment Practices, 54 CONN. BAR J. 523, 530
(1980) (job requirements which are facially neutral may have a disproportionate impact on
protected classes).
292. Smith v. Berks Community Television, 657 F. Supp. 794 (E.D. Pa. 1987). See
supra notes 248-53 and accompanying text for a summary of Smith.
293. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553,557 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 896 (1972).
294. Id. See supra note 255 for further references.
295. See Harmony Volunteer Fire Co. & Relief Ass'n v. Pennsylvania Human Rela
tions Comm., 459 A.2d 439, 442 (Pa. Commw. 1983).
296. It should be noted that the remedy available to volunteers under the statute
would be limited to that of injunctive relief. Since volunteers are not compensated, the
remedy of back pay, which is provided by the employment statute, is inapplicable to volun
teers. Smith, 657 F. Supp. at 795.
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This judicially sound application of the- employment statute to
volunteers, however, does not negate the need for more specific legisla
tion. On the contrary, this discussion should influence legislatures
either to enact an anti-discrimination statute particularly safeguarding
volunteers,297 or to amend the present employment statute to ex
pressly include volunteers. 298 Such legislation would eliminate the
possible confusion ensuing from the inclusion of volunteers, who are
not by definition employees, under an employment statute.
CONCLUSION

Quinnipiac Council addressed the question of whether volunteers
are protected against discrimination under Connecticut's public ac
commodation statute. The Connecticut statute's legislative history
and the judicial interpretations of other states' similar statutes mani
fest a repeated broadening of public accommodation statutes to pro
tect more classes from a larger number of offenses. 299 This expansive
trend seemed to predict a continued enlarging of the public accommo
dation statute to include volunteers. However, the Connecticut
Supreme Court held that the proffer of services was not an accommo
dation because, in offering their services, volunteers are not denied ac
cess to goods and services. Thereupon, the court suggested, without
deciding, that the employment statute might protect those volunteer
ing their services from discrimination. 300
An examination of the characteristics of volunteers, and of the
nature of both the public accommodation statute and the employment
statute, justifies the court's suggestion. As a result of the differences
between these two statutes, the absence of any specific legislation cov
ering the volunteering of services, the necessity of safeguarding volun
teers from the sensitive injustice of discrimination, the broad purpose
of the employment statute, and the many similarities between volun
teers and employees, the employment statute is the appropriate act
under which to safeguard volunteers from the refusal of positions on a
discriminatory basis. Nevertheless, because confusion may ensue from
the fact that volunteers are not by definition "employees," the most
unambiguous means of obtaining protection against discrimination for
297. Since there are many similarities between volunteers and employees, a statute
specifically enacted for volunteers would in many respects resemble the employment
statute.
298. See supra note 267 for a possible amendment to the employment statute.
299. See supra Part I, Sections Band C for a discussion of the legislative and judicial
expansion of the scope of public accommodation statutes.
300. See supra Part II for a discussion of Quinnipiac Council.
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volunteers is the enactment of an anti-discrimination statute specifi
cally safeguarding volunteers, or an amendment expressly including
volunteers in the present employment statute.
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